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THE IMPACT OF CIVILIAN AGGRAVATING FACTORS ON 
THE MILITARY DEATH PENALTY (1984-2005): ANOTHER 
CHAPTER IN THE RESISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES TO 
THE CIVILIANIZATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
Catherine M. Grosso* 
David C. Baldus** 
George Woodworth*** 
In 1984, the U.S. Armed Forces amended its capital punishment system for death 
eligible murder to bring it into compliance with Furman v. Georgia. Those 
amendments were modeled after death penalty legislation prevailing in over thirty 
states. After a brief period between 1986 and 1990, the charging decisions of 
commanders and the conviction and sentencing decisions of court martial mem-
bers (jurors) transformed the military death penalty system into a dual system that 
treats two classes of death eligible murder quite differently. Since 1990, a member 
of the armed forces accused of a killing a commissioned officer or murder with a 
direct impact on the ability of military commanders to run an effective and disci-
plined military is significantly more likely to face a capital court martial and be 
sentenced to death than a similarly situated member accused of a murder con-
nected to the military only fry the identity of the accused. 
This empirical study of charging and sentencing decisions in 104 death eligible 
military murders from 1984-2005 documents contemporary resistance to the 
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civilianization of the military death penalty as manifest in chargi,ng and sentenc-
ing decisions. We conclude that a limitation of death eligible murder to those 
directly impacting military command and control could reduce the risk of arbi-
trariness in the administration of the military death penalty. 
INTRODUCTION 
The threshold question we address in this Article is the extent to 
which the administration of the military death penalty since 1984 
has followed the civilian model of limiting death sentences to the 
most aggravated cases, as defined by a 1984 executive order de-
lineating death eligible murder for the U.S. Armed Forces, or 
whether practice has overridden the reforms and voided the in-
tended civilianizing influence. 1 
This analysis is based on an empirical study of the administra-
tion of the death penalty by the U.S. Armed Forces since 1984 for 
premeditated and felony murder committed by United States mili-
tary personnel.2 Our data include the prosecution of 104 death 
eligible cases from 1984 through 2005, which resulted in the impo-
sition of fifteen death sentences.3 We find an abrupt distinction 
between the charging and sentencing practices in the first six years 
after the 1984 order and the charging and sentencing practices 
after 1990. After 1990, charging and sentencing practices turned 
much of the civilianizing aspects of the 1984 executive order into 
dead letter law. 
Since the founding of the Republic, the military criminal justice 
system stood as a system apart, a system designed to advance the 
needs of military commanders for efficient and effective control of 
soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines. The military system has con-
sistently lagged behind its civilian counterparts in its concern for 
the broad protections associated with the Bill of Rights. While 
many in military command worked to incorporate the protections 
of the Bill of Rights into military criminal justice over time, other 
military leaders have resisted such changes as unnecessary "civilian-
izing" and a direct threat to their ability to run a proper military. 
This empirical study documents contemporary resistance in the 
U.S. Armed Forces to civilianizing changes in the context of capital 
1. Exec. Order No. 12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17152 (Apr. 13, 1984). 
2. Data is presented in tables and figures following the conclusion of this Article. 
3. None of these offenders has been executed. The last military execution occurred 
in 1961. See Death Penalty Information Center, The U.S. Military Death Penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/us-military-death-penalty#facts (on file with the University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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punishment. Our study shows that the charging decisions of com-
manders and the conviction and sentencing decisions of court 
martial members (jurors) since 1990 have essentially nullified the 
deliberate adoption in 1984 of a military death sentencing system 
modeled after those prevailing in over 30 states. These actors have 
transformed the military death penalty system into a dual system 
that treats quite differently two classes of death eligible murder. 
The first class ("military murder") directly impacts the capacity of 
military commanders to run an effective and disciplined military. 
Prominent among military murders are murders of commissioned 
and non-commissioned officers and large scale attacks on fellow 
troops. The second class of "civilian-style murders," such as felony 
murder, murders with multiple victims, and particularly heinous 
killings, have no impact on military command and control. 
Since 1990, a soldier accused of civilian-style murder is signifi-
cantly less likely to face a capital court martial, to receive a capital 
conviction, and to be sentenced to death than a similarly situated 
soldier accused of military murder. After 1990, only one of eight 
military death sentences has involved a civilian-style murder.4 Given 
this reality, this Article queries whether it would be appropriate to 
recognize this de facto transformation by amending military death 
penalty law to bring it back in line with the central purpose of the 
military criminal justice system, that of advancing command and 
control of the armed forces. 
Part II of this Article documents the overall history of resistance 
to the civilianization of military criminal procedure in the U.S. 
Armed Forces. Part III provides details of capital punishment law 
in the U.S. Armed Forces between 1984 and 2005 and then ex-
plains the underlying structure of the study. Part IV documents 
that in the first six years of the new system civilian-style murders 
were identified as sufficiently culpable for capital prosecution and 
death sentences, while after 1990 they disappear almost entirely 
from capital cases. In contrast, military murders exist as a unique 
subset of cases, worthy of the most aggressive prosecution and sen-
tencing. This Part also demonstrates that this disparate treatment 
cannot be explained by different culpability levels in the cases. Part 
V presents possible policy explanations for the emergence of this 
disparate treatment in the post-1990 period. Part VI offers brief 
conclusions and recommendations for addressing the problems 
that arise when such disparate treatment exists. 
4. See Table 3, Lines 9-15 (showing only Witt, Line 14, to be civilian-style). 
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II. THEME OF RESISTANCE: THE SLOW CIVILIANIZATION 
OF COURTS MARTIAL 
There is a history of resistance by some military leaders to efforts 
to "civilianize" the military criminal justice system.5 This resistance 
appeared most famously during the 1920s in the office of the 
Judge Advocate General of the Army over the availability of appeal 
from certain court martial cases.6 Commanders resisting such 
change perceive the military criminal justice system principally as a 
means of promoting discipline to protect the authority and effec-
tiveness of the military command and view efforts to civilianize the 
military system as a threat to those goals.' This tension pits the 
"demands of discipline" against "the requirements of justice."8 
Courts martial are Article I rather than Article III courts.9 As 
such, courts martial were not established along the same guidelines 
or, really, for the same purpose as civilian courts. 10 Courts martial 
are an extension of the executive power (provided by Congress) to 
aid the President in maintaining discipline in the armed forces. 11 
Courts martial form an essential part of a commander's tools for 
maintaining effective command and control. 
Accordingly, courts martial historically have not been held to the 
same due process standards as civilian courts. While many of the 
5. Here, "civilianize" refers to the procedural protections imported from the civilian 
courts in an effort to reform the military system. 
6. See generally JOHN M. LINDLEY, "A SOLDIER IS ALso A CITIZEN": THE CONTROVERSY 
OVER MILITARY JUSTICE, 1917-1920 (1990). 
7. For example, William Winthrop, "the greatest departmental authority upon Mili-
tary Law," stated in 1886 that "Courts-martial are not courts, but are, in fact, simply 
instrumentalities of the executive power provided by Congress for the President as Com-
mander-in.Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and enforcing discipline 
therein." S.T. Ansell, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1919) (citing 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY 
LAw 52-53 (1886) ); see also LINDLEY, supra note 6, at 27 (summarizing the opposition within 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army to civilianizing reforms), 67 (report-
ing a proposed revision to the Articles of War in 1916 that would expand the jurisdiction of 
courts martial to more common law offenses but simultaneously would increase the isolation 
of military law from civilian law). 
8. Kevin]. Barry, A Face Lift (And Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox Commission 
Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military justice, 2002 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. 
DETROIT C.L. 57, 67. 
9. Robert D. Duke & Howard S. Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Anny: Another 
Problem ofCourt-Martialjurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REv. 435, 440 (1960). 
10. See Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 MJ. 152, 157 (C.A.A.F. 1998) ("[I]t is well estab-
lished that courts-martial-which are authorized by statutes enacted pursuant to Article I of 
the Constitution-need not provide a military accused with the same procedural rights 
available to a civilian defendant in a criminal trial conducted under Article III."). 
11. See Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military 
Guuernance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649, 665 (2002) ("Despite pe-
riodic reforms, the military justice system, like the military system as a whole, has long been 
viewed as an extension of the Executive Branch to serve its military needs."). 
SPRING 2010] The Impact of Civilian Aggravating Factors 573 
protections of the Bill of Rights have been applied to the military 
through statute,12 civilianizing changes typically have been resisted 
by military personnel. As early as 1912, the Judge Advocate General 
of the Army stated in a Congressional committee hearing that "the 
introduction of fundamental principles of civil jurisprudence into 
the administration of military justice is to be discouraged. "13 In sub-
sequent testimony, the Judge Advocate General of the Army 
emphasized again that a court martial must be-first and fore-
most-the tool by which a commander maintains discipline and 
control.14 A thorough history of the courts martial system and ef-
forts to "civilianize" the system over the past century, by Kevin]. 
Barry (Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Ret.), casts these efforts as long, 
hard-fought battles met with great resistance by the military.15 
A. Resistance in the Non-Capital Context 
In the non-capital context, military leaders have resisted a num-
ber of civilianizing reforms. These leaders perceived the adoption 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950 as unnec-
essarily imposing civilian procedures on military courts for the 
"primary purpose" of "creat[ing] a system that would be regarded 
with favor by the public, which would earn and hold the public's 
confidence."16 Officers raised concerns that adopting the UCMJ 
"made the effective [and efficient] administration of military disci-
pline within the Armed Forces more difficult."17 Colonel Frederick 
Wiener, who was at one time a strong voice for those opposing ci-
vilianizing changes, argued that the requirement that the accused 
in a military trial be represented by qualified lawyers (as imposed 
by the UCMJ in 1950) was unnecessary and impractical. 18 At least 
12. Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 
II, 72 HARV. L. REv. 266, 294-96 (1958). 
13. Ansell, supra note 7, at 7 (quoting from hearings before Congress in 1912 without 
providing citation). 
14. See Lindley, supra note 6, at 66-68. 
15. See Barry, supra note 8, at 67-69. 
16. George S. Prugh, Jr., Observations on the Uniform Code of Military justice: 1954 and 
2000, 165 MIL. L. REv. 21, 25 (2000). 
17. Id. at 29-30 (quoting a 1953 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of 
Military Service as a Career). 
18. Barry, supra note 8, at 72 n.48. Wiener later argued that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel does not apply to the military justice system. Frederick Bernays Wiener, 
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 1, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1, 49 (1958). At 
the same time, in a second 1958 paper, Wiener wrote with favor about the rights accorded 
members of the military by Congress and seemed to approve of the reforms. See Wiener, 
supra note 12, at 303-04. 
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one officer argued, "The pendulum has swung ... from too much 
emphasis on the 'military' aspect of military justice to too much 
emphasis on the civilian procedural aspects oflaw."19 
While acceptance of the UCMJ grew over time,20 the resistance 
to imposing civilian procedures and protections on military justice 
continues until today. This is reflected in resistance to suggestions 
by the 2001 Commission on the 50'h Anniversary of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (the "Cox Commission") that the conven-
ing authority, a senior officer who functions as the prosecutor in 
military cases, relinquish control over the selection of the members 
who serve in courts martial.21 The Cox Commission recommended 
limiting the role of the convening authority, commenting that "the 
far-reaching role of commanding officers in the court-martial 
process remains the greatest barrier to operating a fair system of 
criminal justice within the armed forces."22 This recommendation 
reflects the concern that members may feel the need to vote to 
convict the accused to curry favor with their commanding officer 
who, in fact, prosecutes the case. 
The Cox Commission report anticipated that this recommenda-
tion would engender controversy,23 and it did. Scholars argued that 
limiting the role of the convening authority would be inconsistent 
with the needs of military command.24 No action has been taken to 
implement this recommendation. 
19. Prugh, supra note 16, at 30. 
20. Id. at 40 (observing in 2000 that "[w]hile the UCMJ deliberately tended to 'civilian-
ize' the court-martial system, that presented no difficulty for the senior judge advocates and 
for the junior officers it presented a welcome professional challenge"). 
21. See WALTER T. Cox III ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH ANNIVER-
SARY OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE§ III.A (2001) (on file with the University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/ 
documents/cox_comm_report2.pdf?rd=l. 
22. Id. at 6. 
23. The commission reported that a recent study by the Committee on Military Justice 
at the Department of Defense had recommended against making any changes to the con-
vening officer's responsibilities. See id. at 8; see al.so Barry, supra note 8, at 101. 
24. See, e.g., Christopher W. Behan, Don't Tug on Superman s Cape: In Defense of Convening 
Authurity Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L. REv. 190, 257-
62 (2003) (noting that the proposed reform inadequately address the needs of military 
command); Theodore Essex & Leslea Tate Pickle, A Reply to the Report of the Commission on the 
50th Anniversary of the Unifonn Code of Military justice (May 2001): "The Cox Commission", 52 AF. 
L. REv. 233, 248--50 (2002) (same). 
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B. Resistance in the Capital Punishment Context 
1. Death Eligible Offenses Under the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice 
575 
There is a long tradition of the use of capital punishment in the 
American armed forces. There are currently fourteen death eligi-
ble offenses in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 25 All but two 
of them currently relate to crimes with important national security 
or military implications which have no counterparts in civilian 
death penalty systems. Mutiny, sedition, and espionage are all in-
cluded in the national security category.26 There are also eight 
death eligible offenses with serious military implications that apply 
only "in time of war" or during combat operations against a foreign 
power,27 and two other offenses with important military implica-
tions that have no "time of war" requirement.28 These are long 
standing offenses that to our knowledge have not been applied 
since the Korean War.29 
The thirteenth and fourteenth death eligible offenses are mur-
der (premeditated and felony murder) 30 and rape31 committed by 
25. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2006). 
26. UCMJ §§ 894 (mutiny or sedition), 906a (espionage). 
27. UCMJ §§ 885 (desertion), 890 (assaulting or willfully disobeying a superior com-
missioned officer), 899 (misbehavior before the enemy), 900 (subordinate compelling 
surrender), 901 (improper use of countersign), 904 (aiding the enemy), 906 (spies), 913 
(misbehavior of a sentinel). 
28. UCMJ §§ 902 (forcing a safeguard), 910 (improper hazarding of vessel). 
29. The Court of Military Appeals treated the Korean and Vietnam conflicts quite dif-
ferently. Compare United States v. Bancroft, 3 C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953), with United 
States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970). 
30. Article 118 of the UCMJ as adopted in 1950 reads as follows: 
Any person subject to this code who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a 
human being, when he-
( 1) has a premeditated design to kill; or 
(2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; or 
(3) is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to others and 
evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or 
(4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, 
sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson; 
is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, 
except that if found guilty under paragraph (1) or (4) of this article, he shall suffer 
death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct. 
UCMJ, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, art. 118, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950). 
31. UCM.J, art. 120. The current UCM.J also defines rape as an offense punishable by 
death. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006). The only service member executed for rape since 
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American military personnel during peacetime anywhere in the 
world.32 A murder conviction is the basis of all of the military death 
sentences imposed since 1960. With one exception,33 murder and 
rape are the most recently established death eligible military of-
fense having been enacted in 1950 by the UCMJ. 
Death eligibility for murder requires no connection between the 
murder and military interests or functions. Military status alone 
makes the statute applicable to military personnel and gives mili-
tary courts martial jurisdiction.34 In terms of the definition of 
1950 was Pvt. John Bennett, who was convicted of rape and attempted murder and executed 
in 1961. See 2 FRANCIS A GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE 
§ 23-32.10 (3d ed. 2006). Since that time, the United States Supreme Court held in Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), that the death penalty is unconstitutional as excessive punish-
ment for the rape of an adult woman. Military courts have held that Coker applies to military 
law, at least when applied to rape of an adult woman. United States v. McReynolds, 9 MJ. 
881, 882 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980) (holding that rape of an adult woman is not a capital offense). 
Moreover, use of the death penalty as punishment for the rape of a child under 12 years of 
age, authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-163, § 552, 119 Stat. 3136, 3257 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 920(b) (2) (2006) ), was recently 
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 
(2008). However, in a denial of rehearing which expressly discussed Article 120 of the 
UCMJ, the Court leaves the door open to capital prosecutions under that article. See Ken-
nedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2008) (opinion of Kennedy,J.,joined by Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, Breyer,JJ., respecting denial ofreconsideration) ("[W]e need not decide whether 
certain considerations might justify differences in the application of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause to military cases (a matter not presented here for our decision)."). No 
current member of military death row has been convicted of rape alone. Compare Table 3 
(Lines 5, 7, 10, 14, 15), with CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCA-
TION FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A. 67 (Winter 2009) (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http:/ /www.naacpldf.org/ content/pdf/pubs/ 
drusa/DRUSA_ Winter_2009.pdf. 
32. Courts martial were first granted jurisdiction to try murder and rape cases during 
the Civil War when these acts were "committed by persons who are in the military service of 
the United States" during "time [s] of war, insurrection, or rebellion." Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 
ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736. In 1916, an amendment to the Articles of War added that "no 
person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical 
limits of the States ... and the District of Columbia in time of peace." Act of Aug. 29, 1916, 
ch. 418, art. 92, 39 Stat. 619, 664. These provisions which denied courts martial jurisdiction 
to try murder and rape offenses when committed within the geographical limits of the 
United States during times of peace survived many revisions to the Articles of War, including 
the Elston Act in 1948. Elston Act (Selective Service Act), ch. 625, § 235, 62 Stat. 604, 640 
(1948). It was not until the adoption of the UCMJ in 1950 that courts martial were granted 
the jurisdiction to try crimes of murder and rape committed in the United States during 
peacetime. UCMJ, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, art. ll8, 120, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950) (cur-
rent version at 10 U.S.C. § 918, 920 (2006)). Two U.S. Courts of Appeal have affirmed that 
courts martial have jurisdiction to prosecute a capital offense in peacetime under the UCMJ. 
Owens v. Markley, 289 F.2d 751, 752 (7th Cir. 1961); Burns v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141, 143 (10th 
Cir. 1959). 
33. There appears to be one capital crime--espionage-that was added since 1950. It 
was created by the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, 99 
Stat. 583, 634 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 906a). 
34. Although the Supreme Court during the late 1960s in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 
U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969), found that courts martial only had jurisdiction to try servicemen 
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capital murder, therefore, the UCMJ mirrored the provisions of 
typical 1950s civilian death penalty statutes that defined first de-
gree and felony murder as capital offenses.35 During this period of 
time, the military system also shared in common with all civilian 
systems complete and untrammeled discretion of the sentencing 
authority on the issue of whether the sentence for capital murder 
should be death or life imprisonment.36 
2. Resistance to Furman v. Georgia (1972) 
The broad sentencing discretion of court martial members be-
came particularly salient after Furman v. Georgia, which held that 
the unguided discretion of sentencing authorities in civilian juris-
dictions violates the cruel and unusual punishments provision of 
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.37 Furman 
invalidated state death penalty statutes across the United States, 
but the majority opinions did not address its applicability to mili-
tary courts. Nevertheless, little thought would be required to 
recognize that the Court's Furman concerns about the risks of un-
bridled discretion of sentencing authorities applied with equal 
force to the military system.38 Despite a suggestion to this effect by 
Justices Powell and Blackmun, dissenting in Furman, 39 and Justice 
Marshall, dissenting in the case of Schick v. Reed two years later,40 
neither Congress nor the President made any effort to reform mili-
tary law or procedures. 
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976) and Profitt v. Florida (1976) that the adop-
tion of statutory lists of aggravating circumstances comparable to 
those found in the Model Penal Code41 and the use of bifurcated 
when the crime had a "service connection," the Court abandoned the "service connection" 
requirement in 1987, in Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987), which held that 
court martial jurisdiction was established by one factor-the military status of the accused. 
35. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (West Supp. 2009); GA. CODE. ANN.§ 17-10-30 
(2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 9711(West2007). 
36. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart,]., concurring). 
37. Id. at 239-40. 
38. SeeUCtvij, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, art. 118, 120, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950). 
39. Justice Powell, dissenting in Funnan, argued that the case voided military capital 
punishment law. Furman, 408 U.S. at 417-18 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[N]umerous provi-
sions of the ... Uniform Code of Military Justice also are voided."). Justice Blackmun made 
the same argument. Id. at 412 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("Also in jeopardy, perhaps, are the 
death penalty provisions in various Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice."). 
40. 419 U.S. 256, 271 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (concluding that a military 
death sentence should be unconstitutional under Funnan). 
41. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.6 (1980). 
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guilt and penalty trials satisfied the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment because they materially reduced the breadth of capi-
tal charging discretion.42 In the Court's view, these reforms limited 
death sentences to the most aggravated cases, thereby eliminating 
the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination in the administration of 
capital punishment.43 
In 1981, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review denied 
the applicability of Furman to the military.44 First, the court found 
that military law, while not notably distinguishable from the un-
constitutional civilian capital punishment laws, had to be 
understood in the context of the military justice system.45 The 
court held that the military justice system itself mitigated any risk 
of arbitrary decision making.46 The court continued to reason that 
the procedures in place arose from the needs of commanders "to 
establish and maintain the armed forces" and should be seen as 
part of "the peculiar requirements which flow from a disciplined, 
ever-ready and effective military community."47 This argument ech-
oes the civilian/military divide presented above. Again, the military 
set itself apart because of the needs inherent in commanding and 
controlling the armed forces. 
A June 1983 Air Force Court of Military Review ruling was the 
first to hold that Furrnan's requirements applied to courts martial 
and that the court martial system was not in compliance with those 
requirements.48 In October 1983, the Court of Military Appeals set-
tled the conflict between the lower military courts, ruling that 





Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194-95; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251. 
United States v. Rojas, 15 MJ. 902 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983) (sentence adjudged Jan. 30, 
45. Id. at 928-29 (noting that "comparison of literal statute provisions" would not suf-
fice for determining whether Furman required changes because "[t]he death penalty is 
imposed and administered in the military justice system under procedures established by 
Congress and the President in the UC!'-0 and [Manual for Courts-Martial], respectively."). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 929; see also United States v. Matthews, 13 MJ. 501 (A.C.M.R. 1982) (en bane) 
(holding that the military procedures fulfilled Furman's requirements). 
48. United States v. Gay, 16 MJ. 586, 596 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (en bane). 
49. United States v. Matthews, 16 MJ. 354 (C.M.A. 1983). In 1984, the appeal in Gay 
reached the Court of Military Appeals, which affirmed the decision. United States v. Gay, 18 
MJ. 104 (C.M.A. 1984). 
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3. Facial Accommodation of Furman v. Georgi,a ( 1972) 
To cure the defect in the military system recognized by the mili-
tary courts, President Reagan requested that his legal advisors, 
presumably in the Pentagon and the Department of Justice, amend 
military law to bring it into conformity with the requirements of 
the Eighth Amendment. 
The product was a 1984 executive order that limited death eligi-
bility to capital cases in which the fact finder determined that one 
or more statutory aggravating circumstances was present in the 
case and that "any extenuating or mitigating circumstances are 
substantially outweighed by any aggravating circumstances."50 The 
aggravating circumstances, known as aggravating "factors" in cur-
rent military parlance, embrace a number of situations with 
distinct military and national security implications that facially ap-
ply to all death eligible offenses, but in practice have no 
applicability to "civilian-style" premeditated and felony murders, 
which constitute the vast majority of death eligible murders com-
mitted by military personnel in peacetime.51 One distinctly military 
aggravating circumstance applies to murder and rape "committed 
in time of war," a condition that has not existed since the Korean 
War.52 
The executive order does, however, specifically exclude from 
murder offenses two omnibus aggravators with significant military 
implications.53 In fact, only one of the omnibus aggravators appli-
cable to all death eligible offenses (grave risk to non-decedent 
victims) has clear relevance to murder cases.54 
The executive order also defines for premeditated murder cases 
an extensive list of distinctly civilian-style aggravating 
. 50. Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3169 Uan. 24, 1984) (Amendments to the 
Manual for Courts Martial). 
51. Id. §§ (3) (b) (accused had intent (i) to "cause substantial damage to the national 
security of the United States," or (ii) to "cause substantial damage to a mission, system, or 
function of the United States" if such damage "would have resulted had the intended dam-
age been effected"), (3) (e) ("the accused committed the offense with the intent to avoid 
hazardous duty"); see infra Part III-D (discussing the distinction between "military" and "civil-
ian-style" murders within the military criminal justice system). 
52. Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3170 Uan. 24, 1984) (Amendments to the 
Manual for Courts Martial) (crime committed "in time of war" when the United States or an 
ally is an "occupying power" or United States forces were "then engaged in active hostili-
ties"). 
53. Id.§§ (3) (a) (the crime was "committed before or in the presence of the enemy"), 
(3) (c) ("the offense caused substantial damage to the national security of the United States, 
whether or not the accused intended such damage"). 
54. Id. at § (3)(d) ("[T]he lives of persons other than the victim, if any, were unlaw-
fully and substantially endangered."). 
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circumstances.55 These aggravating circumstances were clearly in-
spired by the typical state death penalty statute whose aggravating 
circumstances are modeled after those found in the Model Penal 
Code.56 The executive order's focus on civilian-style aggravating 
circumstances for premeditated murder was understandable given 
that six of the seven murder cases from the military in which a 
death sentence had been imposed between 1979 and 1984 involved 
a distinctly civilian-style murder with no special military implica-
tions.57 
In fact, only one part of one of the premeditated murder aggra-
vating circumstances in the executive order is uniquely tailored to 
military circumstances. This aggravator, "7G," classifies as death 
eligible the premeditated murder of a "commissioned, warrant, 
noncommissioned, or petty officer of the armed services of the 
United States" killed "in the execution of office" when the accused 
had knowledge of the victim's status.58 The remainder of the 7G 
aggravating factor reflects an effort to provide special protection 
for law enforcement and corrections officers that is found in most 
civilian jurisdictions.59 
The executive order does not list specific mitigating circum-
stances, which put the military system in the company of the 
Georgia system approved by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Geor-
55. For Article 118(1) premeditated murder, § 3(g) defines the following aggravating 
circumstances: (i) accused committed offense while already under confinement for thirty or 
more years, (ii) felony murder, (iii) pecuniary motive, (iv) compulsion or contract murder, 
(v) escape or avoid apprehension, (vi) victim an important federal official, (vii) victim a 
commissioned or noncommissioned officer knowingly killed "in the execution of office" 
(also known as the "7G" aggravator), (viii) obstruction of justice, (ix) infliction of substantial 
pain and suffering, and (x) multiple victims. Id. at 3170-71. Section 3(h) of the order also 
defines one aggravating circumstance limited to felony murder alone-"the accused was the 
actual perpetrator of the killing." Id. at 3171. 
56. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.6 (1980). 
57. The exception is United States v. Gay, 16 MJ. 586 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (involving two 
victims, one of whom was an officer killed in the line of duty). The civilian-style death sen-
tences included: United States v. Mustafa, 22 MJ. 165 (C.M.A. 1986) (acquaintance rape); 
United States v. Artis, 22 MJ. 15 (C.M.A 1986) (wife victim); United States v. Redmond, 21 
MJ. 319 (C.M.A. 1986) (killed fiancee of a friend); United States v. Hutchinson, 15 MJ. 
1056 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983) (acquaintance robbery); United States v. Matthews, 16 MJ. 354 
(C.M.A. 1983) (rape and robbery); United States v. Rojas, 15 MJ. 902 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983) 
(acquaintance robbery). 
58. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, R.C.M. l004(c)(7)(G) (2008) 
[hereinafter Rule 1004]; see also supra note 55 (listing all of the aggravating circumstances 
tailored to premeditated murder). 
59. Although the text of 7G protects all "officers" (i.e., commissioned, noncommis-
sioned, and police officers), within military culture, as reflected in the cases studied here, an 
"officer victim" case is strictly perceived to be one with a commissioned officer victim-
whether or not the officer was acting in the "execution of office" and whether or not the 
accused knew that the victim was a commissioned officer. 
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gi,a.60 On this basis, military lawyers could properly advise their 
commanders that the military system now available for the capital 
prosecution of premeditated and felony murder was in full com-
pliance with Furman and fully civilianized by virtue of the civilian-
style aggravating factors on which it was based. 
The findings of the empirical research presented in this Article 
reveal that for its first five years of application, the military system 
closely resembled the typical civilian system. However, since 1990, 
military charging and sentencing authorities have de facto created 
a dual system which treats quite differently ordinary civilian-style 
murders from murder with military implications that threaten mili-
tary discipline and the effectiveness of the military mission. It is a 
story of the military's resistance to the full civilianization of capital 
punishment on the ground. 
III. DATA COLLECTION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
This Part describes the data used in this study. It then presents 
military capital punishment law and decision making in death eli-
gible murder cases in the military during the period of the study. 
Finally, it explains our method for distinguishing uniquely "mili-
tary" murder from ordinary civilian-style murder for the purposes 
of this study. 
A. Data Collection 
We collected the data for this study as part of an analysis of the 
role of race and other extra-legal factors in the U.S. armed forces' 
capital punishment system. The sample includes all 104 death eli-
gible cases prosecuted by the armed forces between 1984 and 
2005.61 To be considered death eligible, the accused must have 
committed premeditated or felony murder and there must be one 
or more aggravators present in the case. For each case, the data file 
includes more than 200 variables relating to the characteristics of 
the accused and victim(s), the nature of the crime, the case pre-
sented against the accused, the defense presented, as well as any 
mitigation presented or available, and each significant charging or 
sentencing recommendation or decision in the case. In addition, 
60. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
61. In eight cases, the accused were acquitted of capital murder by members. These 
cases are included in descriptive statistics about the dataset and in analyses of convening 
authority charging decisions. They are otherwise excluded from the analysis. 
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the data includes a detailed narrative summary of each case. We 
tailored our data collection to enable accurate analysis of death 
eligible murders and precise analysis of key decision points in the 
military capital punishment system. 
B. Death Eligible Murder in the U.S. Armed Forces 
The UCMJ authorizes the death penalty as a discretionary pun-
ishment for premeditated and felony murder committed by 
military personnel anywhere in the world.62 Peacetime death eligi-
bility requires no connection between the murder and military 
interests or functions.63 The UCMJ mirrors the provisions of typicai 
civilian death penalty statutes, except that it also authorizes the 
death penalty for rape64 and certain non-homicidal crimes.65 All of 
the cases included in this study involved murder. 
Rule 1004 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, the rule created by 
President Reagan's executive order in 1984, limits death eligibility 
by requiring a finding of aggravating circumstances similar to those 
found in many civilian jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code. In 
cases involving a felony murder conviction, Rule 1004(c) defines 
separate aggravating factors. 66 These aggravating factors, listed in 
Table 1, also mirror those in a majority of civilianjurisdictions.67 
The only aggravating factor for murder that is uniquely tailored 
to military circumstances is the portion of the officer victim aggra~ 
vating factor68 which classifies as death eligible the premeditated 
murder of a "commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or petty 
officer of the armed services of the United States" who is killed "in 
the execution of office" when the accused had knowledge of the 
62. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2006). 
63. See supra note 34 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's abandonment of the 
"service connection" requirement. 
64. UCMJ, art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2006) ("Any person subject to this chapter 
who commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and 
shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct."). Con-
gress amended Article 120 in 2006 and the amendments took effect in October 2007. 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552(a)(l), 
119 Stat. 3136, 3256-57. It still authorizes the death penalty for rape. Id. 
65. A number of non-homicidal military crimes remain death eligible in military 
courts only in times of war. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 890, 901, 906, 913 (2006). An additional 
list of non-homicidal military-specific crimes codified in the UCMJ does not explicitly re-
quire that the offense be committed during wartime for a death sentence to be applicable. 
Id.§§ 894, 899, 900, 902, 904, 906a, 910. 
66. Rule 1004(c). 
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (5) (West Supp. 2009); GA. CooE. ANN. § l 7-10-
30(b) (2008); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 9711 (d) (West 2007). 
68. See infra Table 1, Line 7. 
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victim's status.69 The remainder of this aggravating factor reflects 
an effort to provide special protection for law enforcement and 
corrections officers that is found in most civilianjurisdictions.70 
As a condition for imposing a death sentence, court martial 
members must find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that one or more 
"aggravating factors" exist and that "any extenuating or mitigating 
circumstances are substantially outweighed by any aggravating cir-
cumstances. "71 The rule does not list specific mitigating 
circumstances. Rather, it provides that the accused "shall be given 
broad latitude to present evidence in extenuation and mitiga-
tion."72 Nothing in the text of the UCMJ or relevant rules suggests 
that murders that threaten the command and control of the mili-
tary should be considered more punitively than civilian murders. 
C. Decision-Making in Death Eligi,ble Cases 
Under military law and practice, the death penalty statute is ap-
plied in a three-stage process by two decision-makers-the 
convening authority and the court martial members. The three 
stages are depicted in Figure l.73 
A capital prosecution in a death eligible case is commenced by 
the "convening authority"-normally a general or admiral in the 
accused's command-who has total discretion whether or not to 
seek a death sentence in a death eligible case. A decision to seek a 
death sentence in the case is known as a "capital referral," a deci-
sion that is heavily influenced by the "advice" letter of the 
commander's Staff Judge Advocate ("SJA"), his chieflegal advisor.74 
69. Rule 1004(c) (7) (G). Although the understanding of military "officer" under the 
section appears to include commissioned, noncommissioned, and police officers, within 
military culture, as reflected in the cases studied here, an "officer victim" case is strictly per-
ceived to be one with a commissioned officer victim-whether or not the officer was acting 
in the "execution of office" and whether or not the accused knew that the victim was a 
commissioned officer. 
70. See supra note 67. 
71. Rule 1004(b)(4)(C), (c). The rule uses the phrase "aggravating factors" in most in-
stances. In section (b)(4)(C), "aggravating circumstances" includes the aggravating factors 
discussed above. Id. 
72. Rule 1004(b) (3). 
73. See GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 31, § 23-32.10 (providing details of the capital 
punishment procedures). 
74. See id. The "R'" between the SJA's recommendation and the commander's referral 
is .74. Article 34 advice letters take a variety of forms. Some provide an explicit recommen-
dation in the letter. Often, however, the letter makes no mention of a capital referral but the 
SJA prepares a charge sheet with the choice indicated and informs the commanding officer 
that signing the sheet will implement the SJA's recommendation. In a few cases, the letter 
tells the convening authority what must exist factually to justify a capital referral with no 
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If a case is capitally charged and the capital referral is not with-
drawn by the convening authority, the case advances to a capital 
court martial with the government seeking a death sentence (Stage 
2) .75 A unanimous finding of guilt by the court members advances 
a case to a capital sentencing hearing (Stage 3).76 Finally, court 
martial members consider the aggravating factors and mitigating 
circumstances and make a life or death determination. Since No-
vember 18, 1997, the life sentence option has included a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole.77 
The appellate process following the imposition of a death sen-
tence commences with a request for clemency considered by the 
convening authority who has complete discretion to reduce both 
the crime of conviction and punishment. 78 The convening authori-
ties disallowed the death sentence in 2 of the 15 death sentences 
that have been issued by military courts since 1984. No comparable 
authority exists in civilian courts. 
For death sentences approved by the convening authority, ap-
peals are addressed to the branch specific courts of criminal 
suggestion of what the referral should be. (The R' is a measure of how well the analysis de-
scribes the relationship between two variables. In this case, the variables are the SJA's 
recommendation and the commander's referral. R' is always between zero and one. The 
closer the R' is to the number one, the tighter the relationship between the two variables.) 
75. See id. In many cases that are not charged capitally, the decision of the convening 
authority not to bring a capital case is based on a plea bargain in which the accused pleads 
guilty in exchange for the convening authority's waiver of the death penalty. In capitally 
charged cases, the capital charge is often withdrawn by the convening authority in exchange 
for a guilty plea to the crime charged or a less serious offense, in which event the accused 
escapes the risk of his or her case advancing to a capital sentencing hearing with the gov-
ernment seeking a death sentence. In contrast to civilian courts, a military accused's case 
may not advance to a capital sentencing hearing on the basis of a guilty plea. If the govern-
ment seeks a death sentence, the case must be tried and sentenced by members. 
A crucial feature of the military system distinguishing it from its civilian counterparts is 
that plea bargains are strictly within the authority of the convening authority rather than the 
judge advocates who prosecute the cases on behalf of the government or the military judges 
who try the cases. Military prosecutors may on their own motion initiate plea negotiations 
leading to a waiver of the death penalty and may propose such an agreement to the conven-
ing authority, but no plea bargain involving a waiver of the death penalty can go forward 
without the personal consent of the convening authority. 
76. Rule 1004(a)(2) makes a condition precedent for the imposition of a death sen-
tence the accused's conviction of capital murder "by the concurrence of all the members of 
the court-martial." Approximately 25% of the factually death eligible accused whose cases 
advance to a capital court martial escape the risk of a death sentence at this stage of the 
process by virtue of a non-unanimous finding of guilt or a finding of not guilty on the capital 
murder charge. 
77. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856a (2006). This was added by the National Defense Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 581 (a) (1), 111 Stat. 1629, 1759 (1997). 
78. See GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 31. The convening authority also has the 
power to reduce a life sentence to a term of years. 
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appeals, the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces (CAAF), and 
then the United States Supreme Court.79 
This study analyzes the charging and sentencing decisions illus-
trated in Figure 1, namely decisions to advance death eligible cases 
to a capital court martial (Stage 1), to advance the case from a 
capital court martial to a capital sentencing hearing (Stage 2), and 
to sentence a case to life or death (Stage 3). 
D. De.fining "Military Murder" 
Our analysis turns on the treatment of death eligible murders 
that threaten the authority and effectiveness of the military mission 
as compared to the treatment of death eligible murders which pose 
no threat in this regard. As noted above, for the purposes of this 
study, we designated the former a "military murder." We character-
ize a murder which poses no threat to the military mission and 
most closely resembles a death eligible murder as prosecuted in 
non-military jurisdictions as a "civilian-style" murder.so 
For the purposes of our analysis, threats to the authority and ef-
fectiveness of the military mission included any case involving an 
attack on a military officer and any case motivated by race, includ-
ing those carried out in response to perceived racism.s1 Cases 
involving officer victims include commissioned and noncommis-
sioned officers. These also include two cases in which the accused 
attacked his military unit, killed at least one officer, and killed or 
injured numerous other enlisted personnel.s2 
79. In addition, the Supreme Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction over CAAF's 
decisions. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867a. At the present time, two death sentenced accused have 
exhausted their military appeals through CAAF. In both cases, the accused have also ex-
hausted direct appeals through the Supreme Court. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 
(1996); Gray v. United States, 51 MJ. 1 (C.A.A.F.- 1999), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 919 (2001), 
reh'gdenied, 532 U.S. 1035 (2001). 
80. The degree to which military interests are implicated varies across that class of 
cases. There are also two multiple-victim cases with both civilian and military murders (Ken-
neth Parker and Wade Walker). Individual cases in the database will be referenced by the 
name of the defendant. We include these references to facilitate precise analysis and under-
standing of the cases. See infra Table 3, Cases 10, 11, for more information on these cases. 
81. While some have suggested that cases involving rape of a service member by a ser-
vice member also ought to be perceived as threatening the effectiveness of the military 
mission, the military leadership has yet to identify these crimes in this manner. See, e.g., Miles 
Moffeit & Amy Herdy, Female Gis Repart Rapes in Iraq War: 37 Seek Aid After Allegations of As-
saults lJy U.S. Soldiers, DENV. PosT,jan. 25, 2004, at Al; Miles Moffeit, GI Sex Cases from Iraq 
Often Stall: Army Records Shuw Prosecution Rare, Reprimands from Officers Common, DENV. PosT, 
Apr. 12, 2004, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Military Women Reporting Rapes lJy U.S. Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2004, at Al. 
82. Akbar, Kruetzer. 
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We categorize cases motivated by race as "military" cases because 
of the importance of maintaining non-hostile interracial relations 
to running the military. Maintaining interracial relations has been 
a priority in the military even before the services were integrated 
by executive order in 1948.83 For example, there is evidence that 
during World War II the death penalty was used as a disciplinary 
device to deter racial strife between black and white military units 
over interracial contact between black soldiers and white women.84 
The Vietnam War, which badly strained race relations in the mili-
tary,85 created a new mandate for improving race relations. Under 
the new mandate, race sensitivity and race relations became "big 
business"86 and concerns about race were "broadened into a gen-
eral leadership responsibility. "87 " [ G] ood race relations" are seen 
"as a means to readiness and combat effectiveness."88 Discipline is 
meted out to further this end. Hate speech, for example, "incurs 
sanctions only when it upsets order and discipline or provokes a 
breach of the peace."89 In addition, individual branches and the 
Department of Defense periodically have undertaken reviews of 
race relations in the military and sought to undertake branch-wide 
or service-wide reforms.90 
We coded any case that did not involve an attack on an officer or 
a significant group of fellow service members and was not moti-
vated by race as a "civilian-style" murder. The murders in these 
83. Exec. Order No. 9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311, 4313 Quly 28, 1948) (establishing the 
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in Armed Services). 
84. See J. Robert Lilly & J. Michael Thomson, Executing US Soldiers in England, World War 
II: Command Influence and Sexual Racism, 37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 262, 280-83 (1997). The 
armed forces stationed in England employed policies to segregate African American soldiers 
from European white women after violence was anticipated and reported between African 
American soldiers and white soldiers who objected to having African American soldiers 
appear socially with white women. Id. at 282-83; see also ]AMES E. BLACKWELL, THE BLACK 
COMMUNITY: DIVERSITY AND UNITY 223 (1975) (reviewing similar policies in France in the 
same period). 
85. See generally JAMES E. WESTHEIDER, FIGHTING ON Two FRONTS: AFRICAN AMERICANS 
ANDTHEVIETNAMWAR (1997). 
86. See HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE MILITARY: PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS 58 (George 
Henderson ed., 1975). 
87. CHARLES C. MOSKOS &JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE: BLACK LEAD-
ERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY 53 (1996). 
88. Id. at 53 (reporting on in depth study of race relations in the Army); see also id. at 9 
("[A]n officer's failure to maintain a bias-free environment is an absolute impediment to 
advancement in a military career."). 
89. Id. at 65. 
90. See, e.g., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES (Nov. 30, 1972) (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); MosKos & BUTLER, supra note 87, at 54-63 (discussing 
Army programs meant to review race relations and initiate reforms at the individual or ser-
vice-wide level). 
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cases had no connection to the military, other than the fact that 
the accused served in the armed forces. 
Table 2 presents an inventory of all of the death eligible cases in 
the study, each classified and briefly described according to the 
type of military or civilian-style murder that is involved in each 
case. The civilian-style murders reported in Table 2 involve family 
and acquaintance victims91 or a stranger victim in a felony murder.92 
The military murders involve commissioned officer victims 
(whether or not they are acting in an official capacity) 93 and/or a 
murder that otherwise directly threatens the authority or effective-
ness of the military mission.94 
Military cases make up approximately 18% of the database over-
all, 13% of the cases in the 1984-1990 time period, and 22% of the 
cases in the after-1990 time period. Civilian-style cases comprise 
82% of the cases overall, 87% of the cases in the 1984-1990 time 
period, and 78% of the cases after 1990. There is a slight shift to-
ward military cases in the after-1990 time period but the two 
groups largely maintain an even presence throughout the period 
of the study. 
N. EVIDENCE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN-STYLE 
MURDERS AND MILITARY MURDERS 
Table 3 describes the 15 cases that resulted in a death sentence 
since 1984. The cases are listed in chronological order. Column B 
presents a thumbnail sketch of the facts, while Columns C and D 
report, respectively, the year of sentence and the coding of the case 
as a civilian-style (C) or military (M) murder. 
Fifty-three percent (8/15) of the death sentenced cases in Table 
3 involve civilian-style murder, clearly documenting that the ac-
cused in civilian-style cases have been charged capitally and 
sentenced to death in the post-1984 period. Seven of the eight 
cases, however, occurred between 1984 and 1990. Civilian-style 
cases composed 87% (7 /8) of the death sentenced cases in that 
period. After 1990, the rate falls 39 points from 53% to 14% (1/7). 
In this later period, 86% (6/7) of the death sentences were im-
posed in cases with military implications. This suggests that since 
1990 there has been a de facto presumption against the use of 
capital punishment in civilian-style murders. The only death 
91. Gibbs, Turner, Witt, Thomas. 
92. Dock, Loving, Gray. 
93. Curtis, Kreutzer, Akbar, Quintanilla. 
94. Kreutzer, Akbar, Simoy, Parker, Walker. 
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sentence imposed in civilian-style murder cases since 1990 is Witt,95 
a brutal two victim case with five aggravating factors, which plausi-
bly could overcome a strong presumption against death sentences 
in civilian-style murder cases. We pursue this issue below in detail. 
A. Unadjusted Disparities in the Charging and Sentencing of 
Civilian-Style Murders and Military Murders 
Table 4 documents disparities in charging and sentencing deci-
sions for military and civilian-style murders from 1984 to 2005 
(Part I) and until (Part II) and after (Part III) 1990. Column B of 
Part I reports an overall 31-percentage point, statistically signifi-
cant, military/ civilian disparity in the imposition of death 
sentences among all death eligible cases. The ratio of the two rates 
is 4.1 (41 %/10%). This finding closely mirrors the disparities re-
ported in Columns C, D, and E for capital charging, capital 
conviction, and death sentencing rates. 
A comparison of the overall rates in Parts II and III of Column B 
indicate that the overall military I civilian disparity reported in Part 
I is entirely explained by the large 44-point disparity in the post-
1990 period reported in Part III. During the pre-1990 period the 
death sentencing rates for the two groups of cases were essentially 
the same: 25% and 21 %. The sharp decline in the death sentenc-
ing rate for civilian-style murder after 1990, from 21 % to 2%, had 
the additional effect of drawing down the death sentencing rate for 
all cases after 1990 from 22% to 12%. 
Closer inspection of the data in Part III reveals that the 44-point 
military/ civilian overall disparity in death sentencing rates re-
ported in Column B reflects comparable disparities in both 
charging and conviction decisions ( 44 and 43 points) and in the 
members' death sentencing decisions (66 points), all of which are 
statistically significant at the .10 level. Interestingly, however, Col-
umns C and D of Part II report comparable military/ civilian 
disparities in convening authority decisions before 1990 as well. 
The big difference between the two periods is the military I civilian 
disparity in the members' death sentencing decisions: -14 points in 
the earlier period compared to +66 points in the post-1990 period. 
We consider below what may have influenced the views of court 
martial members about the propriety of capital punishment for 
their comrades post 1990. 
95. Table 3, Case 14. 
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B. Adjusted Disparities in the Chargi.ng and Sentencing of 
Civilian-Style Murders and Military Murders 
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A possible explanation for the military/ civilian murder dispari-
ties documented in the preceding Section could be that the 
civilian-style murders in the later period involve less culpable 
criminal conduct than the civilian-style murders in the earlier pe-
riod. The data does not support this hypothesis. Table 5 breaks 
down the cases by their civilian-style or military murder status, the 
number of aggravating circumstances actually found or factually 
present in the case, and their date of sentencing (1984-1990 or 
1991-2005). Column A marks the civilian-style cases versus the 
military cases; Rows 1-4 present the civilian cases whereas Rows 5-8 
present the military cases. Column B reports the number of aggra-
vating factors, as well as the average culpability as determined by 
the average number of aggravating factors for any single period. 
Column C presented the cases in the earlier period, 1984-1990; 
Column D presents the cases in the later period, 1991-2005. 
If the military murders were overall more aggravated in terms of 
the aggravating factors in the 1984 executive order, we would ex-
pect that to be reflected in the number of those factors that were 
found by members in the cases that advanced to a capital sentenc-
ing hearing or were present in the cases that did not advance that 
far in the process. In addition, if the decline in the overall death 
sentencing rate among civilian-style murders from 21 % between 
1984 and 1990 to 2% after 1990 reported in Table 4 resulted from 
differences in the aggravation levels of the cases, we would expect 
to see that reflected in the comparative numbers of aggravators 
present in the cases during those two periods. 
Table 5 shows that civilian-style cases had as many aggravators in 
the later period as the earlier. Starting with the average number of 
aggravating factors in Row 4, the average number of aggravating 
factors in the later period (1.7), shown in Column D, Row 4, ex-
ceeds the average number in the earlier period (1.5). This increase 
results from a 5-point increase in the percentage of cases with 
three or more aggravating factors (8% in the earlier period, 13% 
in the later period). At least with respect to the number of aggra-
vating factors, the civilian-style cases maintain a roughly 
comparable level of culpability across the study period. 
Likewise, the disparity in aggravation levels between the military 
cases and civilian-style cases remains virtually constant across the 
period. As shown in Row 8, Columns C and D, military cases have 
an average of 1.8 aggravating factors in both 1984-1990 and 
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1991-2005. The disparity between the military and civilian-style 
cases (Row 4 vs. Row 8) is 0.3 point (1.8-1.5) in Column C and 0.1 
point (1.8-1.7) in Column D. Nothing in the number of aggravat-
ing factors in the cases suggests that the culpable conduct in the 
civilian-style cases is sufficiently lower than the culpable conduct 
found in the military cases after 1990 to explain the disparate 
treatment of the two classes of cases over time. 
Table 6 replicates the structure in Table 5 but maps the cases 
using three culpability scales as measures of criminal culpability. 
Part 1 maps the cases using a salient factors analysis to gauge cul-
pability.96 Part 2 maps the cases using a scale derived from a 
logistic regression model of the advancement of cases to a capital 
court martial.97 Part 3 maps the cases based on a logistic regres-
96. The salient factors scale presented here is based on three salient factors measures 
designed as part of the charging and sentencing study to capture what we perceive to be 
military perceptions of criminal culpability based on the statistical evidence, discussions with 
military officers, and our reading of the narrative summaries and records of the cases and 
their charging and sentencing outcomes. We describe them as (1) the vileness factor, (2) the 
accused/victim relationship factor, and (3) the high aggravation factor. 
The vileness factor has three levels: low, medium, and high. The default is "low." An of-
fender receives a "medium" classification if the case involves a rape, robbery, sodomy or 
burglary, or a racial animosity motive. A case receives a "high" classification if it involves 
multiple victims, an ambush, or a serious threat of death or bodily injury to non-decedent 
victims. For the purpose of creating the six-level overall measure, the three levels are scored 
0, 1, 2. 
The accused/victim relationship factor has three levels: (1) victim is a fam-
ily/acquaintance of the accused, (2) victim is a stranger to the accused, and (3) the victim is 
a military police or commissioned officer. The third category is broader than the aggravat-
ing factor based on an officer victim because it includes officer victim cases whether or not 
they were acting in the execution of their office. The data and the opinions of officers with 
whom we have spoken suggest that killing an officer is a highly aggravated military offense 
whether or not the officer is acting in the "execution" of his or her office. For the purpose 
of creating the six-level overall scale, the three levels of this factor are also scored 0, 1, 2. 
The third salient factor distinguishes between cases with a single statutory aggravating fac-
tor and multiple aggravating factors. For the purpose of creating the six-level overall scale, 
the two levels of this scale are scored 0 and 1. 
The procedure for creating the scale is modeled after one based on three comparable sa-
lient factor variables developed by Arnold Barnett with Georgia data from the 1970s. DAVID 
C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 575-77 (1990). 
97. As part of the charging and sentencing study, we developed four logistic regression 
models using legitimate non-racial variables and race variables and used the fully specified 
regression models to estimate a "culpability index" that reflected the probability of an ad-
verse outcome (PHAT) on the basis of "race purged" legitimate variables for each member 
of the relevant racial subgroups. We took three steps to purge the index of race effects. First, 
we estimated the models with both racial and race neutral variables included in the model. 
Second, we omitted the coefficients for the race variables in the construction of the culpabil-
ity index. However, we used coefficients for the race neutral variables that had been 
estimated in a model that included the race variables. This assures that the race neutral 
variables will have no indirect racial effect on the index if they are highly correlated with the 
race variables. On the basis of this culpability index, the average estimated probability of a 
death sentence was 23% for minority accused, while the average estimated rate for wJ:iite 
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sion analysis of death sentences imposed among all death eligible 
cases.98 
The civilian-style cases appear slightly more aggravated in the 
earlier period than in the later period in this table. Part 1, Line 7, 
shows a 0.2-step decline. Part 2, Line 20, shows a 0.74-step decline. 
Part 3, Line 32, shows a 0.51-step decline. It is hard to argue, how-
ever, that the modest decline in culpability seen here can explain 
the steep turn away from capital prosecutions and sentencing in 
the civilian-style cases after 1990. In no case does the average cul-
pability decline more than one step on the scale. 
Even the increased disparity between the average culpability of 
civilian-style cases and the average culpability of military cases over 
time does not seem sufficient to explain the change in practice. 
This disparity is slightly larger according to these culpability scales 
than according to the number of aggravating circumstances. The 
largest disparity is 1.07 points in Part 1, mapping the salient factors 
scale, where it increased from 1.23 to 2.30 (Line 7 minus Line 14 
in Column C versus D). 
It is also useful to estimate military I civilian-style murder dispari-
ties in charging and sentencing outcomes for the culpability 
measures in Tables 5 and 6. For example, consider the comparative 
treatment of cases in the two periods of military and civilian-style 
murder with only one aggravator found or factually present in the 
case. In the earlier period, as documented in Table 5, Column C, 
Row 1, there were 23 civilian-style murder cases with only one ag-
gravator. The convening authority sought the death penalty in 43% 
of these cases (10/23) and obtained a death sentence in 13% of 
the cases (3/23). In contrast, after 1990, the convening authority 
sought the death penalty in only 9% of the 22 single aggravator 
civilian-style murder cases (2/22) and none of them (0/22) re-
sulted in a death sentence. 
accused was 11 %. These predictions for each racially defined group of cases are known as 
"standardized" estimates because they have been adjusted to account for the culpability level 
of each case as determined by the culpability index produced by the regression analysis. To 
build the scale, we sorted the cases into five levels based on the culpability index score esti-
mated for each case. We then estimated a racial disparity within each cell and combined 
those disparities to compute a weighted average of the disparities across all of the cells. Man-
tel-Haenszel is the procedure we use to create these overall estimates. See National Institute 
of Standards & Technology, Mantel-Haenszel Test, http:/ /www.itl.nist.gov/div898/software/ 
dataplot/refmanl/auxillar/mantel.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform). 
The scale used to sort the cases in Part 2 of Table 6 is derived from the model focusing on 
the decision of convening authorities to advance a case to a capital court martial. 
98. The scale used to sort the cases in Part 3 of Table 6 is derived from the model fo. 
cusing on death sentencing outcomes among all death eligible cases. 
592 University of Michigan journal of Law Reform [VOL. 43:3 
The same 1984-1990 versus 1991-2005 pattern appears after ad-
justment for the scales presented in Table 6. In the earlier period, 
the convening authority sought a death penalty in 43% of the 
thirty civilian-style murder cases in levels 0-2 of the salient factors 
scale in Part 1 (13/30) and the accused received a death sentence 
in four cases (13%). After 1990, the convening authority brought a 
capital murder charge in 14% (5/36) of the civilian-style murder 
cases at culpability levels 0-2 and, again, not a single (0/36) ac-
cused in the low- or mid-level cases received a death sentence after 
1990. 
Under the regression-based scale in Part 2, the convening au-
thority sought a capital conviction in 12% (2/16) of the cases at 
culpability levels 1 or 2 in the earlier period versus 4% in the later 
period (1/27). One defendant at these levels of culpability re-
ceived a death sentence in the earlier period (6%, 1/16) and none 
received a death sentence in the later period (0/27). Finally in 
Part 3, the decision to seek a capital court martial for the civilian-
style murder cases at culpability levels 1 and 2 falls from 42% 
(5/12) before 1991to15% (4/27) after 1990, and, even if the civil-
ian-style murder cases at the third and fourth levels of the scale are 
included, not a single death sentence is imposed (0/44) after 
1990.99 
The military I civilian disparities documented in Subsection A 
cannot be satisfactorily explained by controlling for the culpability 
of the cases. 
C. The Declining Influence of Civilian Aggravators, 
1984-1990 Versus 1991-2005 
Over time, the major civilian aggravators in the 1984 executive 
order also had a declining impact on charging and sentencing out-
comes even among civilian-style murder cases. In this Section, we 
demonstrate how three aggravating factors included in Rule 1004 
and commonly found in state statutes lost influence over those 
outcomes in civilian-style murders in 1984-1990 versus 1991-2005. 
We focus first on the impact of the individual aggravators without 
controlling for other factors bearing on culpability levels that 
might influence the outcomes. The second Section controls for the 
99. In contrast, for the military cases, the higher death sentencing rate, 46% (6/13), 
in the later period compared to 25% (1/4) in the earlier period is principally explained by 
higher levels of aggravation among the military cases in the later period. 
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number of victims, as well as for whether the aggravator of interest 
was the only aggravator in the case. 
1. A First Look at Three Important Aggravating Factors 
Table 7, Column C compares death sentencing rates in 1984-
1990 and 1991-2005 among all death eligible cases in the presence 
of each of three aggravating factors. 
First, consider the impact of the multiple-victim aggravating fac-
tor in Part I, which is the or one of the most important aggravating 
factors in all state systems on which data are available. It is equally 
important in civilian-style murder cases in our database. Fifty per-
cent ( 4/8) of the death sentences for civilian-style murder were 
imposed in multiple-victim cases, even though only 15% (12/79) 
of all civilian death eligible cases have more than one victim. This 
translates into a death sentencing rate of 33% (4/12) among all 
civilian-style multiple-victim murder cases in our database. 
Column C of Table 7 documents how this important aggravator 
lost power in civilian-style cases after 1990. During the period 
1984-1990, 37% (3/8) of civilian-style murder cases involving more 
than one victim received a death sentence. This rate fell 12 points 
to 25% (1/4) after 1990. An even more dramatic decline appears 
in the initial charging decisions by the convening authority shown 
in Part I, Column D of Table 7. Until 1990, the convening authority 
sought a death sentence in every single case with more than one 
victim (8/8). After 1990, this rate fell 75 points to 25% (1/4), a 
disparity significant at the .02 level. This pattern also persists in the 
rate at which cases advance to a capital sentencing hearing after a 
unanimous finding of premeditated murder by the members. Ta-
ble 7, Column E, illustrates the 50-point decline, from 75% (6/8) 
to 25% (1/4). 
Part II of Table 7 tells a similar story with respect to felony mur-
der cases. 100 Between the two periods, Columns D and E indicate 
that the rates at which such cases advanced to capital courts martial 
and capital sentencing hearings fell 54- and 40-percentage points 
respectively. Column C reports after 1990 an overall 20-point de-
cline in the death sentencing rate among all felony murder cases. 
100. "Felony murder" here refers to the premeditated murder with a felony aggravator 
factor which appears in Rule 1004(c)(7)(B). The full text of the aggravating factor appears 
in Table l. 
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Part III reports a similar decline in the impact of the intentional 
infliction of substantial harm aggravating factor. 101 Column C indi-
cates that the death sentencing rate for all such civilian-style 
murders dropped 22 points, leaving a rate of only 3% (1/30) after 
1990, a disparity significant at the .03 level. 102 
Table 7, Column D documents the importance of the three ag-
gravating factors in the decision by the convening authority to seek 
a death sentence in a civilian-style case. Focusing again on Parts II 
and III, the steep decline in importance of the felony murder ag-
gravator and the intentional infliction of substantial harm 
aggravator are evident. The felony murder aggravator capital 
charging rate (Column D) fell from 75% (9/12) in 1984-1990 to 
21 % (3/14) in 1991-2005, a 54-point decline that is significant at 
the .02 level. With respect to the intentional infliction of 
substantial harm, the capital charging rate fell from 58% (15/26) 
in 1984-1990 to 20% (6/30) in 1991-2005, a 38-point decline that 
is significant at the .005 level. In short, the convening authority's 
assessment of cases with the most common civilian aggravators 
shifted dramatically after 1990. 
The pattern documented with respect to the diminished use of 
these aggravators after 1990 continues through the decision to ad-
vance a case to a capital sentencing hearing. A case cannot move 
from a capital court martial to a capital sentencing hearing unless 
there is a unanimous finding of guilt as to at least one death-
eligible offense.103 As documented in Table 7, Part II, Column E, 
the rate that cases advance to a capital sentencing hearing for the 
felony aggravator cases fell from 54% (6/11) to 14% (2/14), a 40-
point disparity significant at the .08 level. For cases involving the 
intentional infliction of substantial harm aggravator in Part III, that 
rate of advance fell from 50% (10/20) during 1984-1990 to 10% 
(3/30) after 1990, a 40-point disparity significant at the .003 level. 
101. The intentional infliction of substantial harm factor appears in Rule 
1004(c) (7) (I). The full text of the aggravating factor appears in Table 1. 
102. This disparity persists even after excluding cases that involved more than one vic-
tim. In the period 1984-1990, 20% of the single-victim cases with the intentional infliction 
of substantial harm received a death sentence. After 1990, none of 29 cases advanced to a 
death sentence, a 20-point drop in selection rates. The disparity is significant to the .03 level. 
l 03. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
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2. A Closer Look at the Same Aggravating Factors 
in Single-Victim Cases 
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This Section focuses on the declining impact of the felony mur-
der and intentional infliction of substantial harm aggravating 
factors after 1990 that we considered in Table 7 with the analysis 
limited to single-victim civilian-style murder cases. The first analysis 
presented in Table 8 documents the declining impact of those two 
aggravators on convening authority decisions that advance 
single-victim civilian-style murder cases to a capital court martial 
with the government seeking a death sentence. The second analy-
sis presented in Table 9 replicates the Table 8 analysis with the 
focus on the impact of the two aggravators of interest on death 
sentencing outcomes among all death eligible single-victim cases. 
In both of these tables, we report the declining impact of the 
two aggravators of interest among all cases in which they are 
present (Column C), as well as among the cases in which they are 
the only aggravating factor from Rule 1004 present in the case 
(Column D). In each table, Part I presents the results for the 
felony murder aggravator while Part II presents the results for the 
intentional infliction of substantial harm aggravator. The following 
two Sections examine the evidence presented in Tables 8 and 9. 
a. Evidence of the Declining Impact of the Felony 
Murder Aggravating Factor After 1990 
Table 8, Part I, Column C illustrates that, among all cases with 
the felony murder aggravator found or present, the death sentenc-
ing rate declined from 12% (1/8) in the earlier period to 0% 
(0/12) in the later period. The chief explanation for this decline is 
the drop in the rates at which these cases advanced to a capital 
court martial (shown in Table 9, Column C), from 67% (6/9) in 
the earlier period to 17% (2/12) in the later period. This 
50-point disparity is significant at the .03 level. The decisions of 
members in the capital sentencing hearings, which are not shown 
in either table, also contributed to the decline from a death sen-
tencing rate of 50% ( 4/8) in the earlier period to an 8% rate 
(1/12) in the later period. 104 
104. The declines documented with respect to single-victim cases persist when the 
analysis includes single- and multiple-victim cases. In civilian-style cases with the felony ag-
gravator present, the death sentencing rate falls from 25% (5/20) to 3% (1/30), a 22-point 
decline that is significant to .05. The capital court martial rate declines from 58% (15/26) to 
20% (6/30). This 38-point decline is significant to .01. 
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Table 8, Part I, Column D tells a similar story for the cases in 
which the felony murder aggravator is the only aggravating factor 
found or factually present in the case. It documents a decline in 
the death sentencing rate from 25% (1/4) to 0% (0/3). Table 9, 
Part I, Column D documents a decline in the rates that civilian-
style cases advanced to a capital court martial from 100% ( 4/ 4) in 
the earlier period to 0% (0/3) in the later period. Again the 
100-point decline in the rates at which cases advance to a capital 
sentencing hearing is significant at the .03 level. The members' 
death sentencing rates in the capital sentencing hearings for these 
cases, which are not shown in either table, declined from 50% 
(2/4) in the earlier period to 0% (0/3) in the later period. 105 
Since 1984, a death sentence has been imposed in only one civil-
ian-style case involving only a felony murder aggravator. This was 
the case of Todd Dock (1984; 1989), which also happens to have 
been the first death eligible case prosecuted under the new law. 106 
On its face, the facts of Dock clearly make it death eligible. How-
ever, between that prosecution and 1991, three more single-victim 
felony murder cases advanced to a capital sentencing hearing (in-
cluding Dock on remand) and all were sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 107 Two additional single-victim felony aggravator 
cases advanced to a capital sentencing hearing in 1993 and each 
was sentenced to life imprisonment.108 Since then, no single-victim 
felony aggravator case has advanced to a capital sentencing hear-
ing, and Dock stands as the only such case to have received a death 
sentence since 1984. 
b. Evidence of the Declining Impact of the Intentional Infliction 
of Substantial Harm Aggravating Factor After 1990 
Part II of Tables 8 and 9 presents a similar analysis of the even 
larger pool of single-victim civilian-style murders-the intentional 
infliction of substantial harm cases. Table 8, Column C documents 
a decline in the death sentencing rate among all civilian-style death 
eligible cases with the substantial harm factor found or present in 
the case-from 20% (3/15) in the earlier period to 0% (0/29) in 
105. Disparities also exist with respect to death sentencing rates (22% to 0%) and capi-
tal court martial rates (42% to 8%) when the analysis incorporates single- and multiple-
victim cases. 
106. Dock's crime was committed two months before the effective date of the executive 
order. 
107. The other two cases were Mobley (1987) and Miller (1987). 
108. Adams, Taylor. 
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the later period.109 Again, this is substantially explained by a decline 
in the capital court martial rate from 48% (10/21) (shown in Table 
9, Column C) in the earlier period to 17% (5/29) in the later pe-
riod, a 31-point decline that is significant at the .05 level. For the 
cases with only the substantial harm aggravator present, Table 9, 
Column D documents a decline in the capital court martial rate 
from 42% (5/12) in the earlier period to 8% (1/12) in the later 
. d 110 peno . 
The case summaries in Table 3 indicate that Turner (1985), 
Thomas (1988), and Gibbs (1990) are the only death sentences 
imposed in a substantial harm civilian-style case since 1984, and 
each of these decisions issued before 1991. Before 1992, four other 
substantial harm cases that advanced to a capital sentencing hear-
ing, but not to a death sentence, resulted in a life sentence, as did 
one in 1998.111 Since then, no substantial harm single-victim case 
has advanced to a capital sentencing hearing. 
This analysis explains why 87% (7 /8) of the death sentences in 
civilian-style murders since 1984 were imposed prior to 1991. It 
also explains why the contemporaneous felony and the substantial 
harm aggravating factors, which are present in the vast majority of 
the single-victim cases, have had so little impact on the death sen-
tencing outcomes from 1984 through 2005. 
Further evidence of the resistance of the military to the civiliani-
zation of capital punishment is that the two death sentences 
disapproved by the convening authority, Melvin Turner and Curtis 
Gibbs, 112 were distinctly civilian-style murders involving only the 
substantial harm aggravator. Moreover, in two other civilian-style 
death sentenced cases that were remanded by a military court, the 
death sentence was taken off the table in one case by the conven-
ing authority (Joseph Thomas) 113 and in another case by court 
members who returned a life sentence on retrial and resentencing 
(Todd Dock).114 Moreover, of the seven offenders sentenced to 
109. This 31-point disparity is significant at .05. 
110. Similar disparities appear in a parallel analysis including single- and multiple-
victim cases. The death sentencing rate falls from 27% to 7%. The capital court martial rate 
falls from 75% to 21 %. This 54-point disparity is significant to .05. When the substantial 
harm aggravator is the sole aggravator in the case, death sentencing falls from 25% to 0% 
and the capital court martial rate falls from 100% to 0%. Again the later 100-point disparity 
is significant to .05. 
111. The four cases before 1992 are Mobley (1987), Miller (1987), Poertner (1987), 
and Gonzalez (1988). The 1998 case is Roukis. 
112. Table 3, Cases 2, 8. 
113. Table 3, Case 6. 
114. Table 3, Case 1. 
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death for civilian murder between 1984 and 1990, only two (each 
with two victims) remain on death row. 115 
We believe that the foregoing evidence clearly establishes that, 
for the first five years of the new system, there was an effort to con-
form the military's use of its death penalty to the civilian model 
embodied in the 1984 executive order, but since 1990, the effort 
largely has been abandoned and the use of the death penalty has 
been confined almost exclusively to cases with significant military 
implications. 
V. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF 
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MURDER 
There are a number of possible explanations for the post-1990 
decline of support for the capital prosecution of civilian-style mur-
der cases. The first is a lack of incentive for convening authorities 
to seek death in run-of-the-mill civilian-style murders, especially 
those with a single victim. Unlike elected civilian prosecutors for 
whom a tough on crime policy may be an important way to pro-
mote one's career, flag officers and commanding generals likely 
see little professional advantage from such prosecutions. However, 
when the authority and effectiveness of the military mission is 
threatened, convening authorities are likely to be under the same 
sort of pressure to maintain discipline that civilian prosecutors are 
under to deliver justice with a death sentence in highly aggravated 
civilian cases. 
In terms of identification with the 1984 aggravating factors, one 
can imagine how commanders, particularly in the combat units 
from which the majority of the death eligible cases arise, can iden-
tify with the commissioned officer victim cases, while having much 
less concern with death eligible cases whose Rule 1004 aggravating 
factors do not implicate military discipline. 
It has also been suggested that the first Gulf War, which began in 
August 1990, may have shifted the values of commanders. While 
U.S. military personnel engaged in a handful of short-term en-
gagements previously, "the Gulf War was warfare on a grand scale" 
for the first time in decades. 116 Once troops engaged in active com-
115. Loving (1989) and Gray (1988). The death sentence for Murphy, with three vie· 
tims, was set aside on appeal subject to reinstatement on remand. Until it is reinstated, he is 
no longer on death row. 
116. PETER HUCHTHAUSEN, AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS: A SHORT HISTORY OF 
U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS: 1975-2000 151 (2003) (noting among other things that the 
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bat, commanders may have focused on things that really matter to 
the military, which do not include civilian-style murders. 
Opposition to capital punishment in Western Europe may also 
have had an impact on commanders. All countries in the Euro-
pean Union and any country seeking to join the European Union 
must abolish the death penalty.117 Many European countries have 
been active in advocating for international abolition of the death 
penalty. Tension around this issue came to the fore in the late 
1980s and early l 990s. 118 
For example, tension between the United States and West Ger-
many, which have concurrent jurisdiction over crimes involving 
U.S. military personnel in Germany, was particularly pronounced 
in 1989. In November 1984, a court martial imposed a death sen-
tence on Todd Dock for a civilian murder committed in 
Germany. 119 After Dock, German officials issued several statements 
suggesting that they would refuse to yield jurisdiction to the U.S. 
military in cases involving military personnel at risk of capital pun-
ishment. Moreover, in May 1989, German officials recalled their 
waiver of jurisdiction in a case concerning two soldiers accused of 
attempted rape and a heinous murder of a German woman, and 
tried the soldiers in German courts.120 The German authorities had 
requested letter assurances from the U.S. military authorities stat-
ing that it was "unlikely that the soldiers would be sentenced to 
death by a court-martial."121 U.S. authorities refused to issue the 
letter and Germany recalled jurisdiction.122 
While Germany did not assert jurisdiction uniformly over all 
cases in which the accused might face the death penalty, 123 tension 
Gulf War "required the largest mobilization of U.S. Reserve and National Guard compo-
nents since the Korean War" and resulted in a "massive victory"). 
117. See John E. Parkerson, Jr. & Carolyn S. Stoehr, The U.S. Military Death Penalty in Eu-
rope: Threats frrrm Recent European Human Rights Developments, 129 MIL L. REv. 41, 41-45 
(1990) (discussing the evolving tensions between European nations hosting U.S. military 
bases and the U.S. military authorities over the death penalty). 
118. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989) (holding that Jens 
Soering may not be extradited to Virginia to stand trial for murder unless the risk of a death 
sentence had been removed); see also Kellee A. Brown & Sophia A. Muirhead, Extradition: 
Divergent Trends in International Cooperation, 33 HARV. INT't. LJ. 223 (1992) (discussing several 
similar cases). 
119. United States v. Dock, 26 MJ. 620 (A.C.M.R. 1988); see Parkerson & Stoehr, sufrra 
note 117, at 54. 
120. Rosemary Sawyer, German to Try 2 Gis in Murder Case: Won't Risk Possib/,e Court-
MartialDeath Sentence, STARS AND STRIPES, Aug. 18, 1989, at 28. 
121. Parkerson & Stoehr, sufrra note 117, at 57. 
122. Id. at 57-58; see also Sawyer, sufrra note 120, at 28. 
123. In the case of Army Sergeant James T. Murphy, in 1989, German officials and U.S. 
military officials accused Murphy of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, their 
twenty-one-month-old son, and her five-year-old son from a previous marriage. United States 
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lurked both in West Germany and in other Western European 
countries. 124 The German position drew additional support from a 
1993 amendment to the treaty allowing U.S. armed forces to be 
stationed in Germany. Parties to this amendment, including the 
United States, agreed not to "carry out a death penalty in [Ger-
many] nor carry through such a prosecution which may lead to the 
imposition of such a sentence in [Germany]."125 A non-capital re-
ferral may have come to be seen as a small price to pay to avoid the 
diplomatic incidents that capital referrals in civilian military mur-
ders produced in the 1980s.126 
The evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. Before 1990, 
commanders in Western Europe capitally referred 59% (10/17) of 
the civilian-style murder cases prosecuted in Western Europe, but 
from 1990 through 2005, none (0/7) of the civilian-style cases 
from Western Europe were capitally referred. This explanation 
cannot, however, account fully for the discrepancies documented 
above. Even after the European cases are removed from considera-
tion, a 39-point civilian-style versus military disparity, significant at 
the .005 level, persists in the decision to seek a capital court mar-
tial, 127 and a 20-point disparity, significant at the .07 level, persists in 
death sentencing among all death eligible cases.128 
A third possible explanation turns on a cost-benefit analysis that 
weighs the time and expense of a capital prosecution against the 
likelihood that members will return a death verdict and a death 
sentence actually imposed will ever be executed. A 1990 case illus-
v. Murphy, 30 MJ. 1040 (A.C.M.R. 1990); see also Paul H. Turney, New Developments in Military 
Capital Litigation: Four Cases Highlight the Fundamentals, ARMY LAW., May 2000, at 103, 107-09. 
The West German government expressed opposition to the death penalty and sought assur-
ances from the United States that Murphy would not be subjected to the death penalty. 
Richard]. Wilson, Using International Human Rights Law and Machinery in Defending Borderless 
Crime Cases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1606, 1617 (1997). Despite these concerns, the German 
prosecutor surrendered jurisdiction to the United States and a capital court martial held in 
Germany sentenced him to death. Murphy, 30 MJ. at 1045. 
124. Parkerson & Stoehr, supra note 117, at 58. 
125. Agreement of 3 August 1959, as amended by the Agreements of 21 October 1971, 
18 May 1981, and 18 March 1993, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces with Respect to Foreign Forces 
Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (Done at Bonn Mar. 18, 1993; entered into 
force Mar. 29, 1998; ratification Belgium, Feb. 27, 1998) (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Youngberg, 38 MJ. 635, 636 (A.C.M.R. 1993) ("German 
authorities asserted immediate investigatory and prosecutorial control in this case and re-
fused to release jurisdiction until they were assured in writing that the death penalty would 
not be an option at appellant's trial."), aff'd, 43 MJ. 379 (C.A.A.F. 1995). See generally Alyssa 
K. Dragnich, Development, jurisdictional Wrangling: US Military Troops Overseas and the Death 
Penalty, 4 CHI.J. INT'L L. 571 (2003). 
127. The disparity is 68% (13/19) in 1984-1990 versus 29% (15/51) after 1990. 
128. The disparity is 32% (6/19) in 1984-1990 versus 12% (6/51) after 1990. 
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trates the concern about the inclination of court martial members 
to impose a death sentence in the typical civilian-style murder. In 
the case of Oscar Anderson, the accused, in a fit of sexual jealousy 
(he believed his wife was seeing other men), brutally stabbed his 
wife multiple times in the presence of his nine-year-old daughter 
and left her to bleed to death. 
The Article 32 investigating officer recommended a non-capital 
charge because, in his words, "There is no realistic expectation of 
the death sentence being imposed in this case."129 However, the 
convening authority, an Air Force lieutenant general, accepted the 
Staff Judge Advocate's contradictory recommendation for a capital 
referral. 130 In the capital court martial, the members failed to find 
premeditation unanimously, which took death off the table. In-
deed, the data document that members more frequently took 
death off the table in this manner after 1990 than between 1984 
and 1990. In the earlier period, members were not unanimous on 
premeditation in 23% (5/22) of the civilian cases in which the 
convening authority brought the case to a capital court martial. 
This rate increased to 37% after 1990 (3/8). 
In contrast to civilian jurors for whom capital defendants are 
normally complete strangers, members in a capital court martial 
are also members of the accused's military organization. Moreover, 
enlisted members may be more able to understand the circum-
stances of the accused's situation that resulted in the murder than 
their counterparts on a civilian jury. This may also reflect shifting 
values subsequent to the engagement of ground forces in the Gulf 
War. 
On the likelihood of an execution, one can assume that conven-
ing authorities are aware that no one has been executed in the 
military since 1961. Some convening authorities may also be aware 
(a) that no single-victim civilian accused remain on death row, and 
(b) that only two of the twelve civilian murder accused prosecuted 
for multiple-victim murders since 1984 remain on death row. 
An alternative explanation that might be proposed is the role of 
the availability of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
since 1997. This, however, seems an unlikely explanation. First, the 
sentencing option became available seven years after the observed 
shift in policy. Second, only four of the seventeen civilian-style 
murder cases prosecuted after November 18, 1997 received a life 
129. Report from Officer Wade B. Morrison to Commander Michael C. Short in the 
Case of Oscar Anderson, Jr., Investigation Office's Report (of Charges Under Article 32, 
UC~ and R.C.M. 405, Manual for Courts-Martial) 6 (May 25, 1990) (on file with author). 
130. Recommendation of Staff Judge Advocate to Convening Authority in Case of Oscar 
Anderson 2-3 (June 6, 1990) (on file with author). 
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without parole sentence.131 The convening authority did not seek 
the death penalty in any of these cases. As a result, none of the sen-
tences were imposed in a capital sentencing hearing. 
Overall, the military approach to civilian murder approximates 
the approach of many civilian prosecutors in large urban communi-
ties. With resources scarce and the prospects of a death sentence 
and execution uncertain, capital prosecutions are limited to highly 
aggravated, highly publicized cases that clearly implicate the inter-
ests of justice in civilian eyes. For the military convening authorities, 
the calculus appears quite comparable, with the overriding concern 
being the maintenance of discipline and the protection of the au-
thority and effectiveness of the military command. 132 
CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence presented in this Article documents another chap-
ter in the resistance of the U.S. armed forces to the civilianization 
of military criminal justice. In spite of an 1984 executive order that 
defined death eligible murder in the armed forces principally in 
terms of civilian murder modeled after state law systems, the mili-
tary, in its administration of the death penalty since 1990, has 
applied a dual system in which there is a large disparity in the 
weight it places on military as contrasted to civilian-style murder. 
In this process, the military death penalty has come to be used 
almost exclusively as a disciplinary vehicle to protect the authority 
and effectiveness of the military command. This disparity in the 
treatment of civilian and military murder in terms of the aggravat-
ing factors in the 1984 executive order substantially implicates 
equal justice in the administration of the military death penalty. 
Some have argued more broadly that it may be time to refocus the 
military justice system on military crimes.133 This study supports that 
argument. On the basis of this record, it may be appropriate for 
the President to consider amending Rule 1004 to bring it in line 
with the central purpose of the military criminal justice system, 
that of advancing efficient command and control of the armed 
forces. 
131. Coleman, Dobson, Grandy, Ronghi. 
132. This pattern continued in a New York National Guard case where the convening 
authority rejected an offer to plead guilty to murdering two of his officers in Iraq in June 
2005 in exchange for avoiding the death penalty. Paul von Zielbauer, G.l. Offered to Plea 
Guilty, Then Went Free in Iraq Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at Al. Instead, the convening 
authority, an Army general, brought the case to a capital court martial. Id. The accused, Staff 
SgL Alberto B. Martinez, ultimately was found not guilty by the court martial members. Id. 
133. Turley, supra note 11, at 765--68. 
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TABLE 1 
LIST OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS FROM RULE 1004(c) 
Premeditated Murder Aggravating Factors [Article 118(1 )]: 
1. "The accused was serving a sentence of confinement for 30 years or more or for life at the time of 
the murder." (7)(A)'" 
2. "The murder was committed: while the accused was engaged in the commission or attempted 
commission of any robbery, rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual 
assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated 
sexual contact with a child, aggravated arson, sodomy, burglary, kidnapping, mutiny, sedition, or 
piracy of an aircraft or vessel; or while the accused was engaged in ... any offense involving the 
wrongful distribution, manufacture, or introduction or possession, with intent to distribute, of a 
controlled substance; or, while the accused was engaged in flight or attempted flight after the 
commission or attempted commission of any such offense." (7)(B) 
3. "The murder was committed for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of value." (7)(C) 
4. ''The accused procured another by means of compulsion, coercion, or a promise of an advantage, 
a service, or a thing of value to commit the murder." (7)(0) 
5. ''The murder was committed with the intent to avoid or to prevent lawful apprehension or effect an 
escape from custody or confinement." (7)(E) 
6. "The victim was the President of the United States [etc.]." (7)(F) 
7. "The accused then knew that the victim was any of the following persons in the execution of office: 
a commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer of the armed services of the United 
States; a member of any law enforcement or security activity or agency, military or civilian, 
including correctional custody personnel; or any firefighter." (7)(G) 
8. "The murder was committed with intent to obstruct justice." (7)(H) 
9. "The murder was preceded by the intentional infliction of substantial physical harm or prolonged, 
substantial mental or physical pain and suffering to the victim." (7)(1) 
10. ''The accused has been found guilty in the same case of another violation of Article 118." (7)(J) 
11. "The victim of the murder was under 15 years of age." (7)(K) 
12. "[T)he offense was committed in such a way or under circumstances that the life of one or more 
persons other than the victim was unlawfully and substantially endangered ... ." (4) 
Felony Murder Aggravating Factors [Article 118(4)]: 
13. "[T)he accused was the actual perpetrator of the killing or was a principal whose participation in 
the burglary, sodomy, rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault 
of a child, aggravated sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual 
contact with a child, robbery, or aggravated arson was major and who manifested a reckless 
indifference for human life." (8) 
14. "[T]he offense was committed in such a way or under circumstances that the life of one or more 
persons other than the victim was unlawfully and substantially endangered ... ." (4) 
134. The numbers and letters in parentheses following each aggravating factor indicate 
its location in Rule 1004(c). 
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FIGURE 1 
CAPITAL CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES AMONG 
DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES: UNITED STATES MILITARY (1984-2005) 
Stage 1 
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1The cases of the eight accused acquitted of capital murder by members are 
not included in this figure. However, their cases are included in the analysis of 
convening authority charging decisions. 
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TABLE 2 
AN INVENTORY OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DEATH ELIGIBLE 
MURDERS PROSECUTED IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES (1984-2005) 
Part One: Military Murders 
I. Commissioned Officer Victim 




1987'" killed his officer in charge and the officer's wife because 
of the officer's racist comments 
1986 killed his officer in charge for denying promotion and for 
perceived racial injustice 
1996 killed his executive officer and nearly killed commanding 
officer because of perceived racial mistreatment 
B. Frustration with Military Unit or Military in General 
-Akbar, Hassan 2005 attacked unit after hearing perceived threat against Iraqi 
women by his unit, killing a captain and a major, and 
wounding 14 others 
-Kreutzer, William 
C. Financially Motivated 
-Colon, Ruben 
D. Other 
1996 fired on drill formation, killing a major and wounding 
many others 
1988 killed disbursing officer of his ship to facilitate robbery of 
ship's safe 
-Tarver, Leon 1986 killed officer he met on street shortly after releasing self 
from psychiatric ward 
II. Threat to the Authority and Effectiveness of the Military Command 







(these six individuals were co-
perpetrators in the same crime) 
B. Non-Commissioned Officer Victim 
-Ameen, Arif 
-Bowley, Jacob 
-Burkes, Sr., Donald R. 
-Groveman, Garry J. 
-Levell, Victor 
-Simoy, Jose 
135. Year of sentencing. 
1993 killed a white Marine Lance Corporal for perceived 
1993 injustices done to black marines by white Marines 




1987 killed an NCO during an academic counseling meeting 
2000 killed a platoon sergeant (NCO) while rescuing his friend 
(who was detained for drunkenness) 
1989 killed an NCO believing that the victim was a 
homosexual and child molester and wanting to punish 
him 
1987 killed an NCO by beating and stabbing 
1992 killed an NCO in an altercation 
1992 killed a sergent (NCO) military police officer during an 
2000 armed robbery of cash deliveries to a bank on an Air 
Force base 
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Part Two: Civilian-Style Murders 
I. Family and Intimate Victims 
A. Child Killed in Retaliation for Conduct of Spouse 




1988 killed child to get back at his wife for leaving him 
2002 killed two children after learning of her husband's 
infidelity 
1998 killed son after seizing the child and fleeing a scene in 
which he also attempted to kill his wife and son 
-Turner, Melvin 1985 killed child to retaliate for his wife's infidelity 
B. Spouses, Girlfriends, or Paramours Killed 
1. Due to Sexual Jealousy 
-Anderson, Oscar 1990 killed wife after learning of her infidelity 
-Forrest, Jason 1998 killed wife after learning of her infidelity 
-Gonzalez, Juan 1988 killed wife after learning she planned to leave him for 
another man 
-Hamilton, Jr. Will. M. 1994 killed wife after suspecting infidelity 
-Roukis, Peter 1998 killed wife after learning of her infidelity 
-Strom Mark 1987 killed wife after learning of her infidelity 
-Walford, Charlie 1988 killed wife after learning of her infidelity 
2. Due to Sexual Frustration 
-Miller, Richard 1987 killed girlfriend after he could not get an erection, then 
raped her 
3. To Accommodate an Ongoing Affair/Relationship 
-Davis, Christian 
-Fricke, Michael 
1993 killed wife after conspiring with his girlfriend 
1994 killed wife, fearing that she would learn of his affair, 
divorce him, and take their son 
4. In Response to Divorce, Separation, or Custody Negotiations 
-Coffey, William 1991 killed wife during dispute over separation papers 
-Lipscomb, William 1990 killed wife while finalizing divorce (also raped her) 
-Murphy, James 1987 killed wife during custody argument, then killed three 
children, including his son 
-Paalan, Michael 1996 killed girlfriend after she intended to leave him with their 
son 
-Patterson, Eddie 1995 killed girlfriend after an argument over the status of their 
relationship 
-Ramirez-Silvano, Laz 1995 killed wife to prevent her from leaving him 
-Smith, Donald 1985 killed wife after an argument over the possibility that his 
wife would leave him with their children 
-Snodgrass, Joseph 1991 procured killing of his wife after he was angered by a 
divorce/custody settlement 
-Ward, Timothy 1999 killed former wife after losing custody of their child to her 
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5. Due to a Dispute Escalating to Violence 
-Bartlett, David 2002 killed wife after argument over internet pornography 
killed wife during an argument, then killed his adopted 
son 
-Fuhrman, James 2000 
-Justice, Allen 1989 killed wife after she refused to loan him money 
-Metz, Stephen 1989 killed wife during an argument 
-Whitehead, Edward 1988 killed servicewoman paramour during an allegedly 
consensual sexual liaison when the two argued 
-Willis, Jeromy 1993 killed wife after she agreed to testify against him for 
attempted murder 
6. To Collect Insurance on Life of the Deceased 
-Gamer, Charles 1992 killed wtte 
-Kaspers, Clayton 1993 killed wife 
-Thomas, Joseph 1988 killed wife 
7. Other 
-Ayala, Jesus 1984 killed wife, reason unknown 
-Lobson, Kimberly 2000 killed husband, allegedly because he was abusive 
II. Murder of Acquaintances or Strangers 
A. In an Honor Killing to Protect Status/Reputation 
-Fell, Thomas 1989 killed cross-dressing male after male had performed oral 
sex on him and he discovered the victim's sex 
-Fisher, Justin 2000 helped Glover kill a serviceman who had bested Glover 
in an earlier fight 
-Glover, Calvin 1999 killed a serviceman after losing a fight to him and 
enduring ridicule by another servicemen 
-Seay, Bobby 1999 killed victim (V) who was in a shoving match with Seay's 
girlfriend at a party 
B. Due to Relatively Minor Altercation 












1997 killed V in altercation following a bar fight 
1990 killed V whom he had met at bar when V refused to get 
out of car 
1991 killed V because V was stealing money from their drug 
operation 
1986 killed V after V hit Phillips after he had kicked the V's dog 
1987 killed V after V had made a pass at his wife 
1997 killed V after V fought with Shelton's roommate 
1993 killed V, fearing V would sabotage his attempt to get 
business funding 
2005 killed Vs after Vs made harassing phone calls to him 
1993 killed serviceman after the V spread word of a crime Holt 
and other had committed 
1994 killed a serviceman to prevent him from testifying to 
Jiminez's prior crime 
1995 killed a serviceman to prevent him from testifying to 
Ruiz's prior crime 
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-Stelling, Michael 1994 killed a serviceman to prevent him from testifying to 
Stelling's prior crime 
D. In a Hate Crime 
-Helvey, Terry 1993 killed a homosexual serviceman in a public restroom 
-Vins, Charles 1992 helped another kill a homosexual serviceman in a public 
restroom 
E. Due to Jealousy 
-Meeks, Jeffery 1989 killed a friend and his girlfriend after the two began to 
exclude Meeks 
-Parker, Kenneth 1993 killed the spouse of Walker's paramour 
-Schap, Stephen 1994 killed V after learning of V's affair with his wife 
-Walker, Wade 1993 procured the killing of his paramour's spouse 
F. Motive Unknown 
-Coder, Thomas 1987 killed a serviceman and attempted to feign his death as a 
suicide 
Ill. Financially Motivated Murder 
-Antle, Darryl 1996 killed serviceman before robbing him 
-Bear, William 1997 killed serviceman before robbing him 
-Clark, Alan 1986 killed serviceman and serviceman's wife to rob them 
-Chrisco, Jim D. 1987 killed his sister for the purpose of receiving money 
-Coleman, Hector 1999 killed serviceman to obtain money 
-Dock, Todd 1984 killed taxi driver during robbery 
1989 
-Hirsch Jeffery 1987 killed V to rob him 
-Humiston, Andrew 2003 killed drunken serviceman while robbing him 
-Jordan.Spencer 1985 killed serviceman to rob him 
-Loving, Dwight 1989 killed taxi drivers after robbing them 
-Pereira, Michael 1996 killed V to rob him 
-Reliford, Rocky 1986 killed serviceman and serviceman's wife to rob them 
-Schroeder, Johathan 2003 killed drunken serviceman while robbing him 
-Soto, Alejandro 1997 killed V before robbing him 
-Stinson, Kent 1989 killed V during robbery attempt 
IV. Sexually Motivated Murder 
-Franklin, Emery 1989 killed young girl after she would not consent to his sexual 
advances 
-Gates, Dwan 1991 killed V after raping her 
-Grandy, James 2000 killed V after raping her 
-Graves, Ervin 1994 killed V during rape attempt 
-Gray, Ronald 1988 killed two victims after raping them 
-Mabie, Timothy 1986 killed V after she would not consent to his sexual 
advances and then raped her 
-Mobley, Gerald 1987 killed V during a rape 
-Ronghi, Frank 2000 killed young girl during a rape 
-Schlamer, Shannon 1995 killed servicewoman after a rape 
-Shiloh, Columbia 1999 killed neighbor after raping her 
-Smith, Patrick 1995 killed young girl after raping her 
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TABLE 3 
DEATH SENTENCED ACCUSED LISTED BY YEAR OF SENTENCE AND 
TYPE OF OFFENSE, UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES (1984-2005) 
A B c D 
Name Year of Crime 
Thumbnail Sketch Sentence Type 
1 Dock, Todd A. 1984 C'" 
A robbery murder of a cab driver killed with multiple stab wounds. 
2 Turner, Melvin 1985 c 
A brutal murder of the accused's 11-month-old daughter with a razor blade. 
3 Murphy, James T. 1987 c 
Three victims. A brutal murder of the accused's wife and two children 
whom he bludgeoned and drowned in a bathtub. 
4 Curtis, Ronnie A. 1987 M 
Two victims. Burglary, robbery and murder of the accused's commanding 
officer and the officer's wife with multiple stab wonds in retaliation for racial 
slights by the officer. 
5 Gray, Ronald A. 1988 c 
Two victims. The first was raped and stabbed seven times. The second 
victim was raped and shot four times. There was also a non-decedent rape 
victim. 
6 Thomas, Joseph L. 1988 c 
Brutal murder of accused's wife with a tire iron to collect insurance 
proceeds. 
7 Loving, Dwight J. 1989 c 
Two victims. The first was a cab driver robbed and shot twice in the head. 
The second victim was a cab driver robbed and shot once in the head. The 
accused robbed and attempted to kill a third cab driver who escaped 
unharmed. 
8 Gibbs, Curtis A. 1990 c 
A brutal killing of a female drinking companion who was nearly decapitated 
with a sword. 
9 Simoy, Jose F. 1992 M 
The accused and four co-perpetrators robbed individuals delivering 
proceeds to a bank on an airbase and in the process killed a police officer 
with pipe blows to the head and nearly killed another person. The accused 
was not the triggerperson. 
10 Parker, Kenneth G. 1993 M 
Two victims. Motivated by a believed racial attack on a black marine by 
white marines, the accused and five co-perpetrators kidnapped, robbed 
and killed with a shot to the heart the first white person they encountered, a 
fellow marine. The accused was the shooter. The second victim was the 
male spouse of the paramour of a Marine friend. The accused killed the 
second victim with a shotgun blast to the chest. 
11 Walker, Wade L. 1996 M 
Two victims. The accused, was a co-perpetrator of Kenneth Parker in both 
of his murders. Walker prevailed upon Parker to kill the spouse of Walker's 
paramour and was part of the group of marines who participated in the 
killing of the first white person they could seize and kill. The accused was 
not a trigger person in either of these murders. 
136. "C" indicates a civilian-style murder. "M" indicates a military murder. 
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12 Kreutzer, William J. 1996 M 
A violent ambush attack with rifles on the accused's unit while it was in an 
outdoor drill formation on an Army post killing an officer, a major, and 
wounding serveral others, including at least one officer 
13 Quintanilla, Jessie A. 1996 M 
In retaliation for perceived discriminatory treatment, the accused killed his 
executive officer with a shot in the back. The accused also attempted to kill 
his commanding officer with a nearly fatal shot to his chest. 
14 Witt, Andrew 2005 c 
Two victims. Premeditated stabbing murder of an airman and the airman's 
wife in revenge for phone call harassment and a charge of sexual 
misconduct by the accused. The accused also stabbed four times a non-
decedent victim airman who sought to stop the accused's attacks on the 
decedent victims. 
15 Akbar, Hassan K. 2005 M 
Two victims. At night in wartime, the accused feigned an attack on the unit 
by rolling live had grenades into three tents with sleeping officers and 
opened fire as the occupants fled their tents. Accused killed on officer with 
a shot in the back. A second officer died of 87 shrapnel wounds. Accused 
injured 14 other non-decedent military victims. 
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TABLE 4 
DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN-STYLE DEATH ELIGIBLE 
MURDER (1984-2005): OVERALL (PART I) AND CONTROLLING FOR 
SENTENCING YEAR (PARTS II AND Ill) 
A B c D E 
Rate that Cases 
Death Sentencing Rate that Advanced to a Death Sentencing 
Rate Among All Advance to a Capital Rate in 30 Capital 
Death Eligible Capital Court Sentencing Sentencing 
Sentencing Year Cases Martial Hearing Hearings 
Part I. 1984-2005 
1. Total Cases 16% (15/96) 42% (44/104) 31% (30/96) 50% (15/30) 
2. Military 41%(7/17) 73% (14/19) 59%(10/17) 70% (7/10) 
3. Civilian-Style 10%(8n9) 35% (30/85) 25% (20/79) 40%(8/20) 
4. Diff."' 31 pts.** Diff. 38 pis. *** Diff. 34 pis.** Diff. 30 pis. 
Ratio"'4.1 Ratio2.1 Ratio 2.4 Ratio 1.7 
Part II. 1984-1990 
5. Total Cases 22%(8/37) 62% (28/45) 49% (18/37) 44%(8/18) 
6. Military 25% (1/4) 100%(6/6) 75% (3/4) 33% (1/3) 
7. Civilian-Style 21% (7/33) 56% (22/39) 45% (15/33) 47% (7/15) 
8. Diff. 4 pis. Diff.44pts. Diff. 30 pis. Diff. -14pts. 
Ratio 1.2 Ratio 1.8 Ratio 1.7 Ratio .70 
Part Ill. 1991-2005 
9. Total Cases 12% (7/59) 27% (16/59) 20% (12/59) 58% (7/12) 
10. Military 46% (6/13) 61% (8/13) 54% (7/13) 86% (617) 
11. Civilian-Style 2%(1/46) 17% (8/46) 11%(5/46) 20% (1/5) 
12. Diff. 44 pts. *** Diff. 44 pis.*** Diff. 43 pts.** Diff. 66 pis.* 
Ratio 23.0 Ratio3.6 Ratio4.9 Ratio4.3 
Level of significance of disparity: *=.1 O; **=.05; ***=.01. 
137. "Diff." reports the arithmetic difference between the rate for the military cases and 
civilian-style cases. 
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TABLE 5 
COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF RULE 1004AGGRAVATING 
FACTORS IN CIVILIAN-STYLE AND MILITARY DEATH ELIGIBLE 
MURDERS (1984-1990VERSUS 1991-2005) 
A B c D 
1984-1990 1991-2005 
percentage n percentage n 
Civilian-Style 1 aggravator 59% 23 48% 22 
2 aggravators 33% 13 39% 18 
3 or more aggs 8% 3 13% 6 
Avg. No. of Aggravators 1.5 aggs 39 1.7 aggs 46 
Military 1 aggravator 17% 1 38% 5 
2 aggravators 83% 5 46% 6 
3 or more aggs 0% 0 15% 2 
Avg. No. of Aggravators 1.8 aggs 6 1.8 aggs 13 
TABLE 6 
COMPARISON OF SCALE-BASED CULPABILITY LEVELS IN CIVILIAN-
STYLE AND MILITARY DEATH ELIGIBLE MURDERS 
(1984-1990 VERSUS 1991-2005) 
A B c D 
1984-1990 1991-2005 
percentage n percentage n 
Part 1-5alient Factors Analysis (FACTORS_SCL2X) 
1 Civilian-Style O(Low) 31% 12 33% 15 
2 1 26% 10 35% 16 
3 2 20% 8 11% 5 
4 3 15% 6 20% 9 
5 4 8% 3 2% 1 
6 5 (High) 0 0 0% 0 
7 Av. Culpability 1.44 39 1.24 46 
8 Military O(Low) 0 0 0 0 
9 1 33% 2 0 0 
10 2 0 0 23% 3 
11 3 17% 1 31% 4 
12 4 33% 2 23% 2 
13 5 (High) 17% 1 31% 4 
14 Av. Culpability 2.67 6 3.54 13 
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A B c D 
1984-1990 1991-2005 
percentage n percentage n 
Part 2--flegression Based Scale No.1 (CAS_SCL_B) 
15 Civilian-Style 1 (Low) 18% 7 33% 15 
16 2 23% 9 26% 12 
17 3 13% 5 24% 11 
18 4 23% 9 11% 5 
19 5 (High) 23% 9 6% 3 
20 Av. Culpability 3.10 39 2.33 46 
21 Military 1 (Low) 0 0 8% 1 
22 2 0 0 15% 2 
23 3 17% 1 15% 2 
24 4 50% 3 31% 4 
25 5 (High) 33% 2 31% 4 
26 Av. Culpability 4.17 6 3.61 13 
Part 3-Regression Based Scale No.2 (DTH_W6_SCL) 
27 Civilian-Style 1 (Low) 27% 9 33% 15 
28 2 9% 3 26% 12 
29 3 27% 9 17% 8 
30 4 21% 7 20% 9 
31 5 (High) 15% 5 4% 2 
32 Av. Culpability 2.88 33 2.37 46 
33 Military 1 (Low) 25% 1 0 0 
34 2 0 0 15% 2 
35 3 0 0 23% 3 
36 4 25% 1 23% 3 
37 5 (High) 50% 2 38% 5 
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TABLE 7 
COMPARATIVE CAPITAL CHARGING AND SENTENCING RATES 
FOR EACH OF THREE IMPORTANT CIVILIAN AGGRAVATORS 
IN CIVILIAN MURDER CASES (1984-2005) 
B c D E 
Rates at which Rates at which 
Death Sentencing Cases Advance to Cases Advance to 
Rates Among all Capital Court Captial Sentencing 
Aggravator Civilian Cases Martial Hearing 
% N % n % n 
Premeditated Murder with 
More than One Victim (7 J) 
Cases from 1984-1990 37% 3/8 100% 8/8 75% 6/8 
Cases from 1991-2005 25% 1/4 25% 1/4 25% 1/4 
Disparity (Row a-Row b) 12 points 75 points•• 50 points 
Premeditated Murder with 
Contemporaneous Felony (78) 
Cases from 1984-1990 27% 3/11 75% 9/12 54% 6/11 
Cases from 1991-2005 7% 1/14 21% 3/14 14% 2/14 
Disparity (Row a-Row b) 20 points 54 points•• 40 points' 
Intentional Infliction of 
Substantial Harm (71) 
Cases from 1984-1990 25% 5/20 58% 15/26 50% 10/20 
Cases from 1991-2005 3% 1/30 20% 6/30 10% 3/30 
Disparity (Row 9-Row 10) 22 points" 38 points"' 40 points'" 
Level of significance of disparity: ·= .10; "= .05; "'= .01. 
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TABLE 8 
DEATH SENTENCING RATES FOR CIVILIAN-STYLE SINGLE-VICTIM 
DEATH ELIGIBLE CASES WITH THE CONTEMPORANEOUS 
FELONY (7B) AND SUBSTANTIAL PAIN AND SUFFERING (71) 
AGGRAVATING FACTORS AMONG ALL CIVILIAN SINGLE-VICTIM 
DEATH ELIGIBLE CASES (1984-2005) 
A B c D 
All Cases in Which the Cases in Which Only 
Aggravating Factor in the Aggravating Factor 
Part Aggravator Col. B Appears in Col. B Appears 
% n % n 
I. Premeditated Murder with Contemporaneous 
Felony (78) 
a. Cases from 1984-1990 12% 1/8 100% 8/8 
b. Cases from 1991-2005 0% 0/12 25% 1/4 
c. Disparity (Row a-Row b) 12 points 75 points 
II. Intentional Infliction of Substantial Harm (71) 
a. Cases from 1984-1990 20% 3/15 22% 2/9 
b. Cases from 1991-2005 0% 0/29 0% 0/12 
c. Disparity (Row 9-Row 10) 20 points" 22 points 
Level of significance of disparity: '= .1 O; "= .05; '"= .01. 
TABLE 9 
RATES THAT CIVILIAN-STYLE SINGLE-VICTIM DEATH ELIGIBLE 
CASES WITH THE CONTEMPORANEOUS FELONY (7B) AND 
SUBSTANTIAL PAIN AND SUFFERING (71) AGGRAVATING FACTORS 
ADVANCE TO A CAPITAL COURT MARTIAL (1984-2005) 
A B c D 
All Cases in Which the Cases in Which Only 
Aggravating Factor in the Aggravating Factor 
Part Aggravator Col. 8 Appears in Col. 8 Appears 
% n % N 
I. Premeditated Murder with Contemporaneous 
Felony (78) 
a. Cases from 1984-1990 67% 6/9 100% 4/4 
b. Cases from 1991-2005 17% 2/12 0% 0/3 
c. Disparity (Row a-Row b) 50 points 100 points 
II. Intentional Infliction of Substantial Harm (71) 
a. Cases from 1984-1990 48% 10/21 42% 5/12 
b. Cases from 1991-2005 17% 5/29 8% 1/12 
c. Disparity (Row 9-Row 10) 31 points" 34 points 
Level of significance of disparity: '= .1 O; "= .05; '"= .01. 

